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ABSTRACT 
Terrorist violence against innocent people in Iraq continues despite the 
determination of Coalition and Iraqi forces to stop it. This thesis examines the 
relationship between a terrorist organization’s strategy of using indiscriminate violence to 
attack the civilian population and its operational success. Specifically, the tactic to be 
examined is that of the al Qaeda in Iraq, which has attacked civilians with indiscriminate 
violence (in the context of the insurgency) since the formal termination of hostilities in 
Iraq in May 2003. Using the historical example of the insurgency in Algeria, 1992-1999, 
this thesis hopes to find the answer as to whether, and under what conditions, terrorist 
tactics of attacking civilians with indiscriminate use of violence applied by Iraqi Islamist 
insurgents may be effective in reaching their political aims. Also, this thesis will question 
whether this manipulation of violence can turn the population against the protagonists, 
rather than mobilizing it in favor of one of them. The thesis will answer the question of 
why Islamist insurgents from al Qaeda in Iraq kill civilians in unjustifiable ways: 
slaughtering, decapitating, bombing and shooting hundreds of men, women and children. 
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I. INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND 
THEORETICAL FRAME WORK 
A. BACKGROUND AND THESIS QUESTION 
Al Qaeda branch in Iraq (AQI) is generally regarded as one of the most deadly 
terrorist groups of modern times, and its innovative and sophisticated tactics provides a 
model for Islamist groups through Asia, North Africa and Europe. Al Qaeda’s mass 
casualty suicide bombers, put into action in Iraq, repeatedly demonstrate their willingness 
to kill indiscriminately large numbers of noncombatants. 
Drawing from the historical example of the Islamist insurgency in Algeria in 
1992-1999, the goal of this thesis to find the answer as to whether, and under what 
conditions, indiscriminate terrorist attacks against civilians by al Qaeda in Iraq may be 
effective in reaching their political aims; or, if this manipulation of violence can turn the 
population against them, rather than mobilizing it in their favor. The thesis will answer 
the question of why Islamist insurgents from al Qaeda in Iraq kill civilians in 
unjustifiable ways: slaughtering, decapitating, bombing and shooting hundreds of men, 
women and children. 
Algeria and Iraq were selected because they are the most important examples of 
indiscriminate, high level violence against civilians perpetrated by Islamist extremist 
groups. In both examples the fatality rate is extremely high. More importantly, both 
countries are interesting threshold cases for examining the level at which violence begins 
to have a visible impact. 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The radical jihadists have become key players in the insurgency against the 
United States occupation in Iraq. These are the most dangerous groups that use brutal and 
ruthless tactics to achieve their utopian goals. Violence and massacres of noncombatant 
are not necessarily unique to the Islamist extremists in Algeria and Iraq. This thesis 
argues that intentional killing of noncombatants by radical Islamist terrorist groups in 
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times of war is often part of a deliberate military strategy designed to combat regime 
forces or other rivals in an insurgency and to shape civilian behavior. 
Unlike conventional military forces, insurgencies often rely directly on local 
civilian populations for food, shelter, supplies, and intelligence, as well as the cover of 
safe havens into which insurgents can disappear to avoid detection. Why then would 
insurgent groups choose to carry out such actions, knowing that civilian support is a 
precondition for their very existence? Is there any logic behind these acts of violence? 
What are the causes of the intentional killings of large numbers of civilians in the war in 
Iraq? Which variables can help make sense of indiscriminate violence? 
The thesis will focus on the reasons why terrorist groups target civilians.. Finding 
it difficult to beat U.S. and Iraqi government forces in open fighting, AQI insurgents 
target civilians in order to impose extra costs on the coalition and Iraqi authorities. Their 
methods seem to be effective on operational and tactical levels, however in the long run 
they may fail. 
When comparing historical examples of terrorism and insurgencies in the 
twentieth century, it can be noted that by attacking civilians, al Qaeda in Iraq tries to 
divide the country along sectarian and ethnic borders and undermine international efforts 
to bring peace and stability into the region. Provoking large scale civil war and 
undermining the Iraqi political process may not bring victory to the insurgents, but it can 
deny it to the Iraqi government and the United States. 
1. Methodology 
Case study analysis is the methodology used in this study. This thesis will present 
a set of theoretical hypotheses and qualitative data from the civil war in Algeria in 1992-
1999, and test existing theories against new empirical evidence from the ongoing 
insurgency in Iraq. A rational choice model will be used to search an issue typically 
outlined and understood as irrational: an indiscriminate, large volume of violence against 
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civilians in the context of insurgency and terrorist’s activities in the war in Iraq.1 More 
specifically, this thesis will focus on indiscriminative violence, mass murders and 
massacres of civilians in Iraq and try to find the logic that drives such actions and discuss 
their consequences. The consequences of these acts are of vital importance for the 
process of implementing a successful counterinsurgency strategy. 
This thesis begins by examining how and when violence is observed.2 Next, it 
discusses specific types of violence: purposive, massive, indiscriminate violence against 
civilians and finds out the logic that drives Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups to carry 
out such actions, knowing that they may be counterproductive. 
Chapter II will analyze why the expanding use of violence by the GIA in Algeria 
produced a surprising outcome: violence alienated the group from the population, which 
led to greater defection to the regime and almost total demise of jihadists. 
Chapter III will examine the current status of the AQI Islamist jihadists in Iraq 
and try to find the answer as to why the Sunni turned against their former allies. 
When comparing the cases in Algeria and in Iraq, a pattern of independent and 
dependent variables emerge that form a possible model that policymakers could exploit: 
strategic miscalculations that insurgents and terrorists make by attacking civilians. Case 
comparison shows that the nature of violence and its indiscriminate quality are 
independent variables causing or facing dependent variables of defection to regime or 
turning against terrorists. 
This paper is a study of the consequences of purposive, indiscriminate, large scale 
violence against civilians in a selected group of countries that experienced Islamist 
terrorism.3 A social movement theory approach will be used to analyze civilian 
                                                 
1 A rational choice model explains group behavior mainly as a product of deliberate logical choices 
made by key individuals. 
2 Violence is an action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others. In: 
Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press, California, 1982), 12. 
3 Terrorism is defined as “the strategic use of violence and threats of violence by an oppositional 
political group against civilians or non combatants, and is usually intended to influence several audiences.” 
In: Jeff Goodwin, “A Theory of Categorical Terrorism” Social Forces, Vol. 84, No. 4 (June 2006): 2029. 
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“awaking” - defection to a regime in response to the insurgent’s violence by way of 
creating counterinsurgents, local and tribal militias and political movements.4 
This thesis focuses on the main argument that indiscriminate violence against 
civilians is not only an example of irrational, random violence motivated by extremist 
Islamist ideology (as typically described in the media) but it can also be understood as 
part of a rational strategy, initiated by the Al Qaeda in Iraq, aiming to maximize civilian 
support under a particular set of restraints. The thesis will compare this argument with the 
available evidence: address problems, such as the identity of the victims and the behavior 
of the groups affiliated to al Qaeda; and extend the argument to similar violence in the 
Algerian Civil War. It will also draw a number of implications from these findings and 
discuss a research agenda. 
Finally, the thesis will analyze the determinants of the tactics, strategies, and 
behaviors that Islamist insurgent groups employ in their relationships with a civilian 
population. The data will be analyzed according to a simple theoretical framework in 
which violence is the outcome of insurgent or terrorist organizations pursuing certain 
goals under certain constraints. Applicable information about all those fatalities will be 
used codified according to two variables: (1) the degree of indiscriminate violence of the 
attack, and (2) the strategic aim behind the killing. 
Within the conclusion of the thesis, policy options analysis will be used to 
evaluate alternatives the United States may have in response to these acts of 
indiscriminate violence and ways to eliminate Islamist terrorists from the political 
process in Iraq. 
2. Major Questions and Arguments 
This thesis addresses three main questions: 
(1) What is the relation between a terrorist organization’s strategy and its 
operational success? 
                                                 
4 Social movement theory provides a framework for informal groups’ growth, development and action 
focused on specific political or social issues. Civilian activism, both in Algerian and Iraqi case, is a 
response to the psychological distress produced by acts of insurgent’s violence. 
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(2) How effective can terrorist strategy be when using indiscriminative violence 
in achieving political aims? 
(3) Is there any successful negotiating strategy this violence can produce? 
The answers to these questions require a detailed analysis that combines 
motivations and effects at the individual level with constraints and opportunities at the 
collective level. 
3. Survey of Prior Work on the Question of Violence 
Previous literature offers many studies conducted with the purpose explaining 
government violence against noncombatants in war. There are also a few explanations to 
the question of why insurgents, rebels, armed militias and terrorist organizations kill 
civilians with indiscriminate violence. The recent literature on civil wars suffers from 
poorly specified and empirically untested causal mechanisms of violence against 
noncombatants perpetrated by insurgent and terrorist groups. 
Several theories present explanations for why insurgent organizations implement 
the tactic of indiscriminate violence against civilians that is terroristic in nature. The first 
explanation relates to the fact that “although insurgents have to rely on the popular 
support, this support is not always offered voluntarily.” As an alternative, insurgents need 
to impose fear throughout the civilian population by terror in order to gain such 
obedience. The second explanation reveals that insurgents may openly and deliberately 
target civilians as a strategy of war, “in order to break down the morale of the enemy or 
raise the cost for continued fighting.” Different characteristics of the internal structures of 
rebel groups are offered as a third explanation.5 
                                                 
5 Lisa Hultman, “Killing Civilians to Signal Resolve: Rebel Strategies in Intrastate Conflicts,” (Paper 
presented at the Jan Tinbergen Peace Science Conference, 27-29 June 2005), 2. 
 6
4. Major Debates and Approaches to the Issue 
a. Rational Explanation 
In contrast to the popular prevailing views that violence is an example of 
deadly madness, many scholars argue that there is logic to it and that it has much less to 
do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than many people currently believe. 
Christopher Cramer believes that “Violence makes sense to different people in different 
ways in varied context; and it makes different kinds of sense to one person or group at the 
same time, that is, different rationales and meanings are nor necessarily exclusive.”6 The 
terrorists’ violence, or “performance violence,” is designed to have an impact on the 
several audiences that they affect. The symbolic significance of such acts is 
comprehensive; they have different meanings to different observers. Mark Juergensmeyer 
agrees with Martha Crenshaw that “acts of terrorism are usually the products of an 
internal logic that drives a group into perpetrating terrorist acts, and not of random or 
crazy thinking.” He hesitates, however, to use the term “strategy” for all rationale 
justifications for terrorist actions.7 
Stathis Kalyvas believes that “violence is never a simple reflection of the 
optimal strategy of its users;” and “it has extremely interactive character.” He argues that 
“violence can be used to exterminate a group or to control it.” When violence is primarily 
used to control population (coercive violence) it “becomes a resource rather than the final 
product.” As a result, “coercive violence may be strategic and tactical at the same time.”8 
Kalyvas explains that enormous violence in civil wars is run by the logic of terrorism: 
violence tends to be used by political actors against civilians in order to control them and 
                                                 
6 Christopher Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006), 284. 
7 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 
University of California, 2003), 123. 
8 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 26-27. 
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shape their political behavior. “This is often called ‘terror.”’9 Terrorist and insurgent 
groups target civilians because they want to force the regime into concessions or 
relaxation of coercive control by “spreading insecurity - at the extreme and making the 
country ungovernable.”10 Islamist extremists are not only “fanatics engaged in irrational, 
deviant, unpredictable violence.” Indiscriminate violence is one of many possibilities in 
their repertoires of contention and represents rational calculus about tactical efficiency to 
“facilitate objectives or protect their organizational and political gains.”11 Indiscriminate 
violence emerges for the reason that it is much cheaper than selective violence - its main 
alternative. Therefore so far, al Zarqawi started in Iraq as “the campaign of suicide and 
car bombings that mainly affects Iraqi civilians, predominantly Shi’ites” and later Sunnis 
who turned against al Qaeda.12 
The study on the Algerian Civil War provides an opportunity for 
investigating the mechanisms of a fact traditionally regarded as irrational: large-scales 
indiscriminate acts of violence in a civil war. Kalyvas argues that reckless massacres 
perpetrated by Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Islamist insurgents can be understood “as 
part of a rational strategy aiming to punish and deter civilian defection under specific 
constraints.” These acts of violence were not driven by a radical ideology that justifies 
the extermination of some categories of people or by senseless will to kill people, as 
many scholars believed. He finds out that much of the massacres were highly strategic 
and carefully calculated. Acts of ridiculous violence are “likely to be committed by 
insurgents in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) 
                                                 
9 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” (Paper presented at LiCEP, Duke 
University, April 2000), 3. 
10 Marta Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice” in 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich, 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 18. 
11 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 62. 
12 Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation  (New York: Seven Stories 
Press, 2005), 186. 
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fragmented and unstable rule over the civilian population, (b) mass civilian defections 
toward incumbents and (c) escalation of violence.”13 
Mohammed Hafez reveals that the use of violence by the GIA in Algeria 
was a tactical response to shifting opportunity structures and emerged under particular 
conditions and circumstances. During the 1990s, the GIA perpetrated a great number of 
brutal civilian massacres. Hafez argues that such killings of civilians are more likely to 
occur where the political opportunity structure is characterized by repression, exclusive 
organization and anti-system ideologies. The GIA in Algeria illustrates the “dynamics of 
radicalization.” The expanding violence against civilians, however, produced surprising 
outcomes: it “led to greater defection to the regime.”14 The GIA atrocities turned popular 
support dramatically against the Islamic movement. Quintan Wiktorowicz speculates that 
“Unable to limit the scale of the violence and save the image of jihad, the pragmatists [in 
Islamic Salvation Front] recognized that they could no longer reach their objective of 
political inclusion through the use of violence.”15 
The most important determinants of civilian abuse are internal to the 
structure of the faction. Like many insurgents’ movements, the GIA was, and al Qaeda in 
Iraq is, still a combination of various factions with no centralized, authoritative 
leadership. Humphreys and Einstein offer another explanation of indiscriminate violence 
with significant variations existing in “the extent to which warring groups abuse civilians: 
across conflicts, across groups, and within countries geographically and over time.” The 
authors describe the simple logic of extraction, which is used to generate hypotheses 
about variation in levels of abuse across fighting units. High levels of abuse are exhibited 
by warring factions that are unable to control the behavior of their members because they 
                                                 
13 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” Rationality and 
Society, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1999): 244-245. 
14 Mohammed M. Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of 
GIA Violence in Algeria,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 53. 
15 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Centrifugal Tendencies in the Algerian Civil War,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 
(Summer 2001): 8. 
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are more ethnically fragmented, rely on material incentives to recruit participants, and 
lack mechanisms for punishing lack of discipline.16 
Weinstein’s theory of organizational structure focuses directly on the 
processes throughout terrorist or insurgent groups that produce violence. Indiscriminate 
violence emerges as a strategy in different contexts and to different degrees as a 
consequence of the interaction between rebels and governments fighting for control of the 
state on the one hand and civilians who choose to offer or withhold support from the 
competing parties on the other hand. The author argues that characteristics of the 
environment in which rebellions emerge constrain rebel organizations and shape the 
patterns of violence that civilians experience. The level and character of violence vary 
across rebel groups. Those groups that are constructed around economic endowments are 
likely to produce much higher levels of indiscriminate violence than those rooted in 
social endowments.17 
Indiscriminate violence against noncombatants is also related to the 
insurgents’ performance on the battlefield. Lisa Hultman examines the theory that “rebel 
groups who are losing battles target civilians in order to impose extra costs on the 
government. When rebels attack civilians, the government may incur both political and 
military costs. Violence against civilians is thus used as an alternative conflict strategy 
aimed at pressuring the government into concessions.” Hultman argues that “when rebels 
perform poorly on the battlefield, by losing fighters and failing to defeat government 
troops, they are likely to kill more civilians.” They may choose to act this way in order to 
signal their determination.18 Hultman believes that when insurgents lose battles “they 
need to signal to the government that they are resolute actors,” if they want to keep their 
bargaining position. The purpose of killing civilians is that it functions as a signal, and 
because it is a costly action that requires “little military capacity it is likely to be chosen 
                                                 
16 Macartan Humpreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil 
War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 3 (August 2006): 429. 
17 Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 199-210. 
18 Lisa Hultman, “Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Rising the Costs for Fighting” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol. 19 (2007): 205-206. 
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by the insurgents groups.”19 The al Qaeda’s terrorists shifted their main effort to Iraqi 
civilian targets because they were more vulnerable and had far more political impact.20 
Lisa Hultman suggests that “ethnic wars, in general, are more likely to 
involve indiscriminate mass killings than conflicts waged primarily over political or 
economic issues.”21 Al Qaeda in Iraq has consistently targeted co-ethnic Shi’tes whom it 
has accused of collaboration with the American forces. Abu Mosab al Zarqawi, former 
leader of al Qaeda in Iraq launched a series of attacks on the Shiite leadership, holy 
Shi’ite sites, and Shi’ite men and women on the street. Bruce Riedel reveals that Al 
Zarqawi’s actions were part of a considered strategy planned before the invasion. 
Targeting Shi’ites isolated and exposed U.S. forces to attack. Zarqawi wanted “the arena 
to be cleared of any rival before the American army withdraws from Iraq so the 
Mujahideens would gain mastery over Iraq, set up Sharia courts, suppress heresy and all 
the things that are repudiated by Islam.”22 Anthony Cordesman suggests that “Iraq has 
shown all too clearly, that the long history of sectarian violence and tribal wars has not 
been erased from the minds of much of the Middle East.”23 
Post, Ruby and Shaw believe that “certain regions in the world have long 
accepted violence as a quasi-legitimate means of expressing dissatisfaction; resolving 
political, economic, and social disputes; and wresting political control from the opposing 
group” (e.g., in Algeria and Iraq). The authors state that “in these regions, violence is an 
expected feature of the political order.” They argue that “groups seeking to affect 
political change under such circumstances are more likely to perceive violence as the 
necessary means for implementing their agenda. These regions are historically prone to 
                                                 
19 Lisa Hultman, “Killing Civilians to Signal Resolve: Rebel Strategies in Intrastate Conflicts” (Paper 
presented at the Jan Tinbergen Peace Science Conference, 27-29 June 2005), 22. 
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency: The Nature of Attacks and Patterns and 
Cycles in the Conflict,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, 
3 February, 2006), ii. 
21 Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Linsday, “Draining the Sea: Mass Killing and 
Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization, Vol.54 (Spring 2004): 382. 
22 Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” New York Times, nytimes.com (7 May 2007). 
<http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20070501faessay_v86n3_riedel.html>, accessed 23 May 2007. 
23 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ a Fundamentally Different Strategy.” 
Middle East, (25 September, 2006). 
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communal conflict, military coups, insurgency, and revolution, and are fertile grounds or 
political violence and terrorist group formation.”24 The outbreak of the civil war can thus 
be seen as a socio-economic process aimed at encouraging accumulation of wealth. 
Michael Moran uses an implicit rational actor model to describe, driven by 
ideology, al Qaeda’s behavior. He argues that “When it comes to matters related to 
politics and war, al Qaeda maneuvers around its dogmas with alacrity,” and “Al Qaeda’s 
goals are set by fervent devotion to a radical religious ideology, but in its short-term 
behavior, it is a rational political actor operating according to the dictates of real politic.” 
According to al Qaeda, the organization sees extreme violence as a means of cleansing 
the world from bankrupt, idolatrous rulers. In this understanding, al Qaeda’s violence “is 
a part of wholly conventional war that by keeping alight the flame of Islam will 
nevertheless have near cosmic consequences.” Al Qaeda is able “to pursue its interests by 
any means available; conventional morality impinges on its political thought only with 
regard to its utility in manipulating others.”25 Islamist terrorists, as well as, other terrorist 
groups, are not often senseless or indiscriminate in their attacks, even if they appear to be 
so. Their targeting choices are significantly driven by ideology. Drake explains that 
“Different ideologies of groups operating in the same geographical and social 
environment develop different patterns of target selection.”26 
b. Islamist Violence 
Dolnik and Gunaratna believe that Islamist terrorist groups, with their 
different world view, are “more immune to indiscriminate mass-casualty violence than in 
the case of nationalist separatist groups.” However, in their irrational beliefs, Islamists 
are not “irrational fanatics who do not seek to benefit a constituency.”27 The persistence 
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of indiscriminate violence has driven speculation that it is an irrational reflection of 
particular ideologies, sometimes based on and motivated by religion imperatives. Radical 
extremist groups are not absolutely rational in their decision making to use violence. 
They are driven by a mixture of expressive and rational motives to achieve their utopian 
goals.28 
Islamist terrorists from GIA in Algeria and al Qaeda in Iraq often 
legitimize their violence against civilians as a “Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially 
because of religious sanctions that allow the use of violence as an act of defense and to 
preserve the will of God in Islamic communities.”29 The jihadists say that “they are 
committed to the destruction of the entire secular world because they believe this is a 
necessary first step to create an Islamic utopia on earth.”30 Derived from the one verse in 
the Quran and a few in the Hadith, “the jihadis are convinced that creating fear in the 
hearts of the unbelievers is a tactic in their war supported by Islamic law.” Habecks 
writes that one of the main Islamic fundamentalism ideologues Sayyid Qutb “clearly was 
advocating the use of terror tactics not just against aggressors or open enemies of his 
version of Islam, but against anyone who did not support him.” Even though the Islamic 
jurisprudence determined that noncombatant women, children, and monks or nuns could 
not be killed, “almost every jihadist group affirms a desire to kill or maim man, women, 
and children in the most horrific ways in order to strike fear in their enemies.”31 What 
makes such groups especially dangerous is their belief that achieving their goals of 
killing of thousands of innocent civilians – including Muslims – is not only legally 
justified but commanded by God Himself. They see victims “not necessarily as an enemy 
whom one kills in hate or for symbolic value, but rather as poor human beings who will  
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be saved by being killed.” For these reasons, “killing thousands of people 
indiscriminately would be psychologically much easier than to do so as part of a political 
strategy or in revenge.”32  
Bryan Caplan argues in his model of rational irrationality that “religious 
terrorists and their sympathizers are irrational in the rational expectations of the term.” 
False beliefs lead them to “take the action that would be optimal if your belief were true, 
instead of the action that is optimal in the world as it is.” Terrorist’ irrational beliefs have 
consequences that are “primarily paid by other people.”33  
The Islamist extremists prefer a state of war to peace because it gives them 
the moral justification to acts of violence. Violence, in turn, offers them the illusion of 
power. By leveling mosques and killing many people, AQI jihadists assert that they 
“have ultimate control over the entity and its centrality.” Because power is largely a 
matter of perception, AQI created the impression that by perpetrating these horrific acts, 
it had “enormous power and that the ideologies behind them had cosmic importance.”34 
The “holy terror’s” “radically different value systems, mechanisms of 
legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world view” makes 
this type of terror predominantly different from secular terror. Hoffman argues that “for 
the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty 
executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative.” Thus, while 
“secular terrorists generally consider indiscriminate violence immoral and 
counterproductive, religious terrorists regard such violence not only as morally justified, 
but as a necessary expedient for the attainment of their goals.” Finally, “where the secular 
terrorists see violence primarily as a mean to an end, the religious terrorists tend to view 
violence as an end in itself.”35 Max Abrahams argues that Islamist terrorist groups with 
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their “maximalist objectives,” based on radical religious ideology “aimed to destroy a 
target’s state society and values,” and more importantly “whose attacks on civilian targets 
outnumbered attacks on military targets” usually fail to achieve their policy objectives 
using coercion.36 
c. Overall Literature Assessment 
Studies on large scale violence perpetrated by Islamist groups against 
civilians in civil wars generally agree that this violence is driven by logic. Violence, as a 
mean, is used by political actors against civilians in order to shape their political 
behavior. Contrary to popular belief that the GIA in Algeria or al Qaeda in Iraq kills 
simply because they are motivated by ideology, numerous authors provide evidence that 
it is a rational strategy to reach their goals. 
Not all authors agree on the causes of such violence, but common themes 
emerge, that under certain conditions, a strategy of indiscriminate violence is counter-
productive. 
C. INSURGENTS’ VIOLENCE 
Indiscriminative, large scale violence against civilians has always been seen as an 
essential component and natural outcome of war - civil war in particular.37 What 
differentiate most civil wars from other forms of political instability are the levels of 
violence produced in these conflicts.38 
The radical jihadists from GIA had become key players in the insurgency against 
the military regime in Algeria, just as al Qaeda in Iraq resisted the authority of Iraqi 
Interim Government and United States occupation. Even though the manpower and 
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number of attacks attributed to GIA and al Qaeda in Mesopotamia have been overstated, 
many observers argue that what is uniquely dangerous about these groups is the 
spectacular and ruthless nature of their violence. GIA’s and AQI’s methods are presumed 
to be more dramatic, more provocative, and have a greater ripple effect on the countries’ 
fragile political environment. 
Violence and massacres of noncombatants, however, are neither unique to the 
Islamist insurgents in Algeria nor to insurgents in Iraq. Kalyvas believes that targeting 
civilians is a common consequence of armed conflict. Intentional killing of 
noncombatants in times of war is often a part of an insurgent’s deliberate, military 
strategy designed to combat regime forces or other rivals in insurgency, and “to shape 
popular support (or collaboration) and deter collaboration with their rival (or 
detection).”39 As a strategically weaker side, insurgents avoid conventional battles with 
regime forces, preferring to use covert and surprise tactics, often focusing on 
noncombatants, whom they depend on for support and sustenance and as a shield against 
detection. Weinstain argues that “Civilian support is important to the outcome of conflict: 
noncombatants are in position of power, able to shift their support from one side to 
another, to provide or withhold resources necessary for the groups’ operation, and to 
offer information to combatants about who is supporting the opposition.”40 
1. Terror as a Strategy 
Charles Tilly acknowledges that “considered as a strategy, terror works best when 
it alters or inhibits the target’s disapproved behavior, fortifies the perpetrators’ standing 
with potential allies, and moves third parties toward greater cooperation with 
perpetrators’ organization and announced program.”41 Ariel Merari affirms that insurgent 
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strategies may take a variety of forms among which terrorism, the easiest form of 
insurgency, always takes place.42  
Islamist terrorist groups, as other political actors, deploy violence to achieve 
certain goals. Political actors do not need to use violence if they enjoy high levels of 
control and cannot use selective violence when they have no control. As a result, 
sometimes they decide to use indiscriminate acts of violence, even though the logic 
behind this violence can be counterproductive.43 The primary significance of violence 
against civilians lies in its consequences. To its proponents, violence is not an end in 
itself but a means to achieve certain political and social outcomes. 
In the case of violence by organized Islamic groups, the purposive nature of the 
violence is usually obvious, since the groups issue statements and communiqués. Being a 
resource, rather then the final product, violence is primarily used to control a population. 
Violence is intended to shape the behavior of the targeted audience by changing the 
expected value of particular actions. However, it is not necessary for the Islamist terrorist 
groups to resort to violence in massive way; they choose to kill hundreds, instead of a 
single person. Massive violence performs a communicative function with a clear 
deterrent aspect and can be used both in tactical and strategic levels.44 In any case, 
insurgents must communicate effectively to their audience the idea that terror is the only 
weapon appropriate to the situation. Thomas Thornton argues that “Whatever 
justification the insurgents create, the dysfunctional use of indiscriminate violence is 
considered immoral and as a sign of weakness and a dangerous extremist mentality of 
those using it.”45 
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2. Indiscriminate Violence 
The differentiation between selective and indiscriminate violence depends on 
public perceptions, since it is possible to pretend to be selective by indiscriminately 
targeting isolated civilians. Indiscriminate violence is much more visible than its selective 
counterpart and, as such, is seen to be more common. To distinguish between 
indiscriminate and discriminate violence is very difficult. Kalyvas argues that when 
people are unsure of what to expect from insurgents and start to perceive insurgent 
violence as indiscriminate, not selective, the result of using of this tactic is that it may 
backfire and cause defection to the regime instead of causing support of the insurgents.46 
What is more, when civilians became convinced that insurgents may abuse them, they 
often choose to resist.47 Indiscrimination is often thought of as a necessary attribute of a 
terrorist campaign. If terrorists do not want be relatively easy to combat, they must stay 
unpredictable in their use of violence. However, total indiscrimination is not reasonable 
and such “terror is most effective when it is indiscriminate in appearance but highly 
discriminate in fact.”48 
The significance of indiscriminate violence is usually overstated because of low 
visibility that selective violence produces. The low cost of indiscriminate violence can 
also explain the emergence of this type of violence. It is easier to kill the innocent people 
on the street than identify, locate, and attack enemies in their strongholds. 
The insurgent’s use of indiscriminate violence is related to lack of information 
rather than ideology. Insurgent groups deliberately employ violence to maintain civilian 
support in order to avoid civilians’ detection, which may have “potentially devastating 
consequences for a group’s survival.”49 The main goal of indiscriminate violence is to 
shape civilian behavior indirectly through association. Indiscriminate violence targets 
people independently of what they did or could have done. The negative consequence of 
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using it is that it is perceived as deeply unfair and immoderate. It may cause emotional 
reactions like anger, resentment and desire for revenge, making people, especially those 
more impatient and eager, “to undertake risky actions.”50 
Insurgents’ behavior in the conflict, especially in its early stages, shapes civilians’ 
expectations about how groups are likely behave in the future. Despite the “breakdown of 
institutions and physical infrastructure, information manages to flow during civil wars.” 
From village to village and city to city information about attacks and insurgents’ behavior 
spreads quickly, often damaging the group’s reputation.51 Indiscriminate violence may 
appear excessive and unjustified and, as a result, alienate the population. It may cause the 
insurgents, loss of popular support. Islamist terrorists try to compensate this potential 
alienation by justifying their actions as the “result of the absence of choice or the need to 
response to the regime violence.”52 
Insurgents’ indiscriminate violence often generates incentives for collaboration 
with the regime, thus generating defection instead of deterring it. Those Sunnis who 
supported AQI were almost as unsafe as those who were not taking sides or opposing it. 
Facing massive strikes of suicide bombers and car bombings on a daily basis they could 
do little or nothing to escape death. “Confronted with high levels of indiscriminate 
violence, many people prefer to join the rival actor,” who best guarantees their security, 
“rather than die a defenseless death” in the street or in the bazaar in a suicide attack.53 
GIA in Algeria expanded its violence to those who were either unable or 
unwilling to support the Islamist cause. Many people wanted to carry on with their lives 
and did not wish to take sides in the conflict. For radical jihadists, it was a treachery that  
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must be punished by death. The expanding violence against civilians led to greater 
defection to the regime, mainly by the creation of self-defending, anti-insurgent 
militias.54 
Indiscriminate violence is seen as an essential element of terrorism. 
Indiscriminate terrorism is directed against anonymous individuals by the prism of their 
belonging to a specific ethnic or religious group, nationality or some other collectivity. 
Islamist terrorists that target civilians indiscriminately display varying degrees of 
tolerance for harming anonymous bystanders. When terrorists indiscriminately attack 
civilians, they usually attack those categories of noncombatants which they see as 
benefiting from, supporting or having a significant capability to influence the 
government. The main strategic objective is to “induce complicitous civilians to stop 
supporting or to proactively demand changes in, certain government policies or the 
government itself.”55 Indiscriminate violence, like other forms of political violence, is 
used to achieve a variety of objectives; however, this type of violence is used mainly to 
control a population, rather than looting, displacing, or eliminating it. 
Indiscriminate violence by insurgents may make civilians exhausted of the war 
and force them to commit themselves to one side. Civilians who had initially collaborated 
and supported insurgents formed militias and set up watch posts around their villages and 
towns to prevent the insurgents from entering and obtaining supplies. They even started 
to physically fight insurgent groups. 
Violence often involves a wide range of tactics. AQI’s suicide missions are one of 
the methods of indiscriminate violence used to deter civilians. They mostly occur in 
places and times where selective violence is extremely difficult or impossible to control. 
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3. Mass Casualty Violence 
The war in Iraq has seen a disproportionately large numbers of mass casualty 
suicide bombings causing thousands of deaths. This is a significant distinction in terrorist 
tactic compared to mass massacres perpetrated by GIA during the civil war in Algeria. 
Many of these attacks were carried out in such a manner as to be both dramatic and 
horrifying. The explosive devices used were often aimed at killing and wounded massive 
numbers of people rather than damaging buildings. Jihadists “are certainly willing to risk 
the deaths of innocent Muslims by using weapons that cannot discriminate between 
soldiers and civilians and by attacking their enemies in public places frequented by 
noncombatants.”56 
Valentino defines mass killing as the intentional killing of massive numbers of 
civilians, members of any kind of ethnic, religious or political group – “at least 50,000 
intentional deaths over the course of five years or less.”57 Chris Quillen, analyzing mass 
casualty bombers whom he describes as modern terrorists, used criterion of 25 deaths or 
more in a bombing attack.58 
However, the cost and risks of massive, indiscriminate violence – including its 
potential to provoke greater opposition, alienate supporters, and draw third parties into 
conflict – often outweigh its potential as an insurgent’s strategy. Quillen argues that 
“Inadvertently or purposefully killing a large number of people may cause a backlash 
among the group’s supporters or potential supporters”59 and may launch a process of 
massive dissatisfaction and even armed resistance. 
4. Consequences of Violence 
Violence against civilians oftentimes is likely to produce gradual changes in 
public attitudes, social behavior and the economy. Depending on the level of population 
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response to violence, terrorist may achieve: enthusiasm, fright, anxiety and despair – the 
most extreme level of response.60 The most easily seen consequences of violence are 
those of immediate and direct effects: people killed and property destroyed. These 
impacts in their turn can eventually produce changes in peoples’ attitudes and behavior in 
a variety of contexts: economic, social and political. 
The “open season” and declared takfir, accusation of apostasy, on the entire group 
of Muslims, as well as the demonstrative nature of indiscriminate killings or maiming of 
innocent people has a secondary impact. They draw out “feelings of revulsion and anger 
in those who witness them.61 Excessive violence may “lead civilians to flee, undermining 
a group’s ability to obtain the support it needs to survive.”62 People may be so 
disaffected and alienated from the insurgents that they refuse to cooperate with them. 
Carter Malkasian argues that “Perceptions matter in a guerrilla war, as in all 
conflict.” Local population perceiving the government or occupying power as 
uninterested to lower the costs of counterinsurgency may join an insurgency or actively 
support it. Most importantly, “they may abandon the insurgency because they perceive 
insurgent violence as pointless in the face of a determined government or occupying 
power.”63 “In the long term, a group’s abusiveness may destroy the human and physical 
base of the local economy on which armed groups often depend.” The economy will be 
affected as production or the black market is disrupted and people migrate from violent 
areas. What is more, in a presence of a totally insecure environment, social activities will 
decline if people are afraid to go out. Most importantly, incapability of the local regime 
or occupying power to suppress the insurgency and “to enforce its rule over the 
population can create chaos and dissatisfaction, and consequently breakdown in law-and-
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order might result in an increase in ordinary crime.”64 Some Sunni tribes in Iraq became 
alienated by al Qaeda atrocities and intimidations against Sunni civilians who were 
supporting Islamist fighters, as well as AQI’s disruption of local business, started to 
cooperate with American forces. They formed the Al Anbar Salvation Council and local 
militias to combat the threat from al Qaeda and to expel the extremists from their 
territories.65 
Insurgents try to avoid striking indiscriminately against civilians for several 
reasons. Civilians may be potential members or allies of their movement, thus the use of 
indiscriminate violence may anger or repel them and may cause their defection to regime. 
This tactic may be seen as harmful to the cause and can prevent or break alliances with 
actual or potentially sympathetic third parties. Terrorism may also provoke state 
repression (for which insurgents will be blamed by their constituents) and what is more, 
state repression may weaken or even destroy the movement itself.66 To be successful, 
insurgents must be selective in their use of violence to avoid alienating the civilians on 
whom they depend.67 As noted by Kalyvas, “To be efficient, terror needs to be selective; 
indiscriminate terror tends to be counterproductive. In a regime of indiscriminate terror, 
compliance guarantees no security; in such a situation joining the opponent can actually 
increase the probability of individual survival.”68 
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D.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to answer an important question: Why do Islamist insurgents 
resort to anti-civilian violence? Through the review of the existing literature on the 
subject of indiscriminate violence against noncombatants, some general themes are 
obvious. 
First, much of the violence directed at civilians in the course of war is intended. 
The main goal of this violence is to shape civilian behavior and maintain its support. 
High levels of indiscriminate violence are committed by insurgent groups that are unable 
to stop defection in their ranks, lose on the battlefield or operate in an ethnically 
fragmented environment. Indiscriminate violence is easier and cheaper than selective 
violence. 
Second, contrary to popular belief indiscriminate violence against civilians is not 
only an irrational example of random violence motivated by Islamist ideology, as 
typically described in the media; it can also be understood as part of a rational strategy. 
This is initiated by the Al Qaeda in Iraq, aiming to maximize civilian support under a 
particular set of restraints. The Islamist ideology insufficiently explains the decision to 
rely on violence as a means to an end. 
Third, indiscriminate violence seems to be counterproductive. In this context 
compliance is almost as unsafe as noncompliance. The victims perceive the threat to be 
so great and unavoidable that may shift their support to the political actor who can 
provide credible protection against violence. The expanding violence against civilians 
alienated Islamists from local population, generated resistance and led to greater 
defections to the regime, mainly in the form of anti-insurgent militias. This response 
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II. CASE STUDY: VIOLENCE IN THE CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter discussed the broader implications of the insurgents’ use of 
indiscriminate violence (that result in mass casualties) against civilians in civil war. This 
chapter presents the case study of the use of violence by radical jihadists from the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) in the Algerian Civil War in 1992-1999. During the 1990s, the GIA 
had become a key player in the insurgency against the military regime in Algeria and 
“was responsible for an outbreak of civilian massacres that were notorious for their 
brutality.”69 The spectacular and ruthless nature of the GIA violence had a great ripple 
effect on the country’s fragile political environment. During the conflict, some 150,000 
people were estimated to have been killed in the terrorist insurgency, characterized by 
incredible cruelty on both sides. 
The GIA’s expanding atrocities against civilians turned popular support 
dramatically against the Islamic movement, producing the surprising outcome of great 
civilian defection to the regime. The large scale of the Jihadists’ violence destroyed the 
image of jihad and alienated the group from the population so much, that the organization 
“could no longer reach its objective of political inclusion through the use of violence.”70 
The purpose of studying the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s is to analyze the 
mechanisms of a fact traditionally regarded as irrational: massive scale of ridiculous acts 
of violence in a civil war and the outcome this violence can produce. More specifically, 
the purpose is to examine the GIA’s wanton violence and reckless massacres as a rational 
strategy, aimed at maximizing civilian support and punishing and preventing civilian 
defection under specific constraints. These acts of violence were not only driven by a  
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radical Islamist ideology that justifies the extermination of some categories of people or 
senseless killings, but were strategically and carefully calculated to be dramatic and 
provocative. 
B. ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR 
1. Background: Stolen Election – Guerilla War Begins 
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major feature of 
Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, which represented a profound challenge to the 
Algerian nation-state. Radical Islamism rejected the idea of an Algerian nation-state and 
its principle, the conception of the Algerian people as constituting a nation. In opposition, 
they offered the Islamic conception of the umma, the universal community of believers 
whose existence could be guaranteed only by a government based upon Shari’a - Islamic 
law. The Algerian case exemplified the beliefs of radical Islamism that generally derived 
its inspiration from the Salafiyya movement. Islamist ideas mobilized a significant 
number of Algerians, who were frustrated by the stagnation of the Algerian economy, 
failure of Arabization of the public administration, decades of little political freedom and 
a poor educational system. Thus a sustained opposition to the state occurred.71  
Formed in 1998, the largest and most influential party, the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) had won the 1990 local and regional elections, causing the humiliating defeat of the 
ruling coalition – National Liberation Front (FLN). What is more, in December 1991 FIS 
captured 188 out of 430 parliamentary seats in the first round of the first open legislative 
elections.72 The Islamist party’s objective was to set up an Islamic state in Algeria and to 
strengthen the religious aspects of the state that had always existed, but which had 
become obscured by the hegemony of the small secularist minority. Martinez states that 
“Its program worried a section of society and the military leaders who were afraid of 
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becoming expiatory victims of an Islamic regime based on righteousness.”73 When 
elections were ultimately rescheduled for December 1991 and the FIS was once again on 
the verge of achieving a decisive electoral victory, the army generals staged a coup d’etat, 
halting the democratic experiment and banned the FIS. Those events set off an armed 
confrontation and Algeria found itself in the middle of a civil war.74 The regime 
outlawed the FIS and its related Islamist organizations, dissolved city halls the FIS had 
conquered in 1990 and attempted to wrest control of insubordinate mosques. “The 
military coup discredited the moderate wing of the FIS that had put such trust in electoral 
institutions as a way to bring about change. This, along with the fact that many of the key 
leaders of the FIS were in prison, allowed more radical elements to rise to the fore, 
especially those who formed the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).”75 
2. History of Violence in Algeria 
The history of 1990s Islamist violence in Algeria had its beginning with Mustafa 
Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Algerian Movement, which for five years (until  his death in 
1987), led bloody campaigns against representatives of the regime. He had become a 
symbol for many Algerians, to which they would later return. Many former members of 
its movement later joined the FIS, and when the FIS was banned, many militants “turned 
to guerrilla activity as the only strategic option left to them.”76 Bouyali’s involvement in 
criminal activities anticipated the crimes committed by the AIS and the GIA. The 
Algerian “Afghans,” veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation, 
also played an important role in the formation of the Islamic extremist groups. They 
formed the core of the hard-line fundamentalists fighting to topple the military backed 
government and established an Islamic state.77 Their first attack on a border post at 
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Guemmer in November 1991 “is usually considered to mark the beginning of the political 
violence of the post-Chadli crisis.” The Algerian regime pointed to this episode “during 
and after parliamentary campaign as revealing the Islamist’ true intentions.”78 However, 
“the ubiquity of violence in Algeria’s past is another potential reason for the fierce 
character of the … struggle.” At almost every period in Algerian history, from the 
Muslim conquest, through the Ottoman rule and especially during French colonialism, 
“Algerian’s relation to the state and to politics generally has been one of coercion, force 
and resistance.”79 Above all, “the mythicised experience of the war of independence and 
of mudjahidine who fought in it played a disproportionately large part in the psychology 
of Algerians in the 1980s and 1990s.” Algeria’s Islamists sought to portray their fight as 
the final phase of the liberation, and that the armed struggle was most the honorable way 
to achieve justice.80 
3. Islamist Resistance 
Following cancellation of the elections and proclamation of the state of 
emergency in 1992, armed Islamist organizations emerged publicly to challenge the 
regime. Those events put an end to any legitimacy for the regime in the eyes of those who 
had voted for the FIS, and created conditions for marginal groups to capitalize on the 
disarray of the ex-FIS electorate and thus legitimize jihad. Graham Fuller notices that 
“What had been emerging as uncomfortable accommodation between a reformist 
presidency and the FIS suddenly turned into a zero-sum game that has brought the 
country into a state of massive violence, paralysis, and guerilla warfare.”81  
There were around sixty Islamic extremist groups in Algeria in the mid and late 
1990s. They ranged from small cells operating in urban areas to militias boasting as many 
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as 50-60 armed guerrillas active in remote mountainous areas.82 Security forces soon 
neutralized the small groups that started jihad, such as Takfir wa-l Hijra. Since the 
banning of the FIS in March 1992, in opposition of the regime the Islamic Armed 
Movement (MIA) was founded.83 It was the largest and most broadly based Islamic 
extremist organization among ex-FIS sympathizers in the early stages of civil war. It 
attracted all of the discontented people that wanted some action. For five years, this 
Islamist organization led bloody attacks against security forces and representatives of the 
state.84 Its strategy of using violence aimed to encourage the state to regret its decision to 
ban the FIS and to legalize the Islamist party again. Roberts notices that “Challenge that 
the GIA posed to the MIA has apparently made impossible for the MIA to envisage any 
negotiated settlement for as long as it has been in danger of being outflanked by an 
apparently more radical rival.” This competition between the two movements was thus 
the immediate cause of the spiraling intensity of violence since January 1994.85 
The fundamental change in the situation in 1994 led to the transformation of the 
Algerian Islamic Movement (MIA) into the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). The objective 
of this change was to “correct the growing perception of MIA as a ‘moderate’ 
organization whose emir lacked the determination and brutality of the feared GIA.” The 
AIS publicly proclaimed its allegiance to the FIS, becoming its armed wing. The new 
group concentrated its attacks on the security forces and state employees, and had 
regularly condemned the killing of innocent civilians and foreigners perpetrated by the 
GIA.86 Apart from the GIA, none of armed Islamist groups succeeded in grabbing 
national and international media attention for their military actions and political demands. 
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C. ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA) 
1. GIA Emergence 
In 1993, a new Islamist faction emerged as the main Islamic force, the Armed 
Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armee, GIA), which had greatly threatened the MIA’s 
position and undermined prospects of a political compromise between the FIS and the 
government. Wiktorowicz writes that “The GIA quickly distinguished itself from other 
armed groups through its willingness to use extreme forms of violence.”87 Martinez 
suggests that “The failure of the ‘people’ to raise up against the regime convinced” 
Islamist factions “that war cannot be prosecuted on the basis of the people’s spontaneous 
feelings.” The ex-FIS sympathizers “recognized the legitimacy of their struggle and gave 
them the necessary support.” For the jihadists and for the regime forces, “control of the 
Islamist communes became a military and political stake in the conflict.”88 
The FIS maintained its position that resorting to armed attacks against the state 
had been justified as an instance of legitimate rebellion against an illegitimate regime, 
with the aim to return to constitutional legitimacy and readmit the banned FIS to the legal 
political process. This doctrine sharply distinguished the FIS from the extreme 
revolutionary jihad of the GIA. The Armed Islamic Group turned to violence in order to 
secure the revolutionary overthrow of the state and “employed violence against civilians 
and foreigners in a strategy of imposing Islamist power and the Islamist agenda by 
indiscriminate terror.”89  
The political view of the conflict was based on Qari Said’s, one of the GIA’s 
ideologues, motto: “No dialog, no reconciliation, no truce.”90 The radicalism of this 
approach led to the temporary marginalization of the other armed Islamist organizations. 
The GIA condemned the FIS electoral strategy and ominously declared, “Power is within 
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the range of our Kalashnikovs.” Ray Takeyeh believes that the GIA’s philosophy 
professed that the “failure of the Islamic movement to reclaim power was due to a lack of 
resolution in the pursuit of jihad.” Based on the experience of the GIA leaders who had 
fought as volunteers against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s, the argument 
that guerilla force could bring down an illegitimate regime had found wide audience.91 
Until September 1993, the term “GIA” did not appear in the Algerian press, even 
though some followers of a leading “Afghan” extremist Abdelhak Layada used this term 
when occasionally attacking on women, journalists and intellectuals. In response to 
intensified Algerian security forces’ operations against guerrillas, the “Afghans” began to 
form more closely organized groups around Algiers.” Because of “army and police 
forces’ brutality, young people were more likely to join the radical GIA than the more 
modest AIS..92 
2. GIA Objectives 
The main objective for the GIA was to overthrow the secular regime in Algeria 
and to replace it with an Islamic state. In pursuit of this goal, the organization refused any 
unity with the FIS and made it clear that it was not its armed wing. Takeyh admits that 
the jihadists stated clearly, “their goal diverged from that of the FIS; they did not seek the 
resumption of the electoral process or the rehabilitation of the political order, but the 
creation of an Islamic Utopia through armed resistance. The human way - elections - had 
failed. Now the only option was to engage in jihad against an illegitimate regime that 
claimed to be Muslim but that was, in the eyes of the radicals, an infidel order.” He 
notices that “The challenge of the GIA was not just to the regime but to moderate 
Islamists who had participated in the political process and accepted its demands and 
limitations.”93 Malley believes that “The GIA grew out of this sentiment as a collection 
of scattered groups determined to use violence at all costs.”94  
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Under its first leader, Mansouri, the GIA shared the MIA’s objectives and general 
approach. However, following his capture by the security forces, the GIA adopted a 
different orientation, which tended to involve the immediate and coercive re-Islamisation 
of the populations of the areas it controlled, a strategy that pitted it not only against these 
populations, but also against MIA and, subsequently, the AIS. 
3. GIA Mobilizing Structures  
a. Manpower Mobilization 
The GIA was formed by a coalition of the former followers of Mustafa 
Bouyali movement, the “Afghans” and hardliner dissidents from the MIA and the FIS, 
which were favoring a strategy of violence. Martinez notices that the GIA realized there 
existed among the young, undereducated and mostly unemployed Algerians (who were 
increasingly turning to militant Islam), “a deep-seated desire for dissidence.”95 The 
organization, though, recruited its fighters from among the disaffected youth of the 
slums, the unemployed, veterans of the Afghan war, and members of criminal gangs for 
whom the politicization of banditry offered a unique means of social rehabilitation.96 The 
decision to join the organization seemed to be based on social alienation, rather than by 
religious conviction. It became an exclusive organization bent on a total war against the 
ruling regime. All groups and individuals who wanted to join the GIA had to declare their 
allegiance to the Salafiyya tradition and abandon any previously held “innovations.”97 
b. Group Organization 
The GIA was composed of several separate groups of an estimated 
strength of 20,000 fighters in the El-Djama’a (military wing of the GIA). They operated 
in different areas, especially in Sidi Bel Abbes in the west, the Medea district south of 
Algiers, the eastern suburbs of Algiers and the Jijel district in northeastern Algeria. These 
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groups were more or less autonomous, but had in common their absolute refusal of any 
dialogue or negotiation with the state, and their ruthless employment of the most cruel 
and savage methods. The GIA gave its armed groups complete autonomy, and every 
suburban Emir had the right to represent the organization in his commune. 
4. GIA - Anti-system Movement; Conflict of Values 
Havez describes the GIA as “an exclusive organization bent on a total war against 
the ruling regime” that sought to overthrow incumbent government. Although the 
military coup of 1992 was the impetus for armed struggle, the leaders of the GIA 
portrayed jihad as a struggle against apostasy, infidelism, and tyrannical rule. Moreover, 
the GIA did not make any distinctions among non-GIA Algerians. Anyone who sustained 
the regime in one way or another, even through tacit approval, was considered an 
apostate, infidel, or tyrant, and consequently deserved death.98 The GIA classification of 
people “as either ‘enemies of Islam’ or ‘supporters of the jihad,’” called upon civilians to 
“choose sights under pain of death.”99 
The Armed Islamic Group rejected the notion that its struggle was a response to 
the military coup. The organization viewed its jihad as a broader struggle to free the 
Muslim world of un-Islamic rulers and establish the “rule of God” and as such, treated 
the struggle in Algeria as a part of the larger struggle against apostasy and infidelism.100 
In this context, the Algerian regime was considered as illegitimate; thus none of its polity 
members or constituency was considered innocent. Transferring from the political aspects 
to the religious turned the struggle into a conflict of values. The GIA gave new meaning 
to the word jihad: “The jihad in Algeria is an absolute religious obligation which is 
imposed on everyone, like fasting, prayer, the almsgiving required by law and the 
Pilgrimage, and the killing of foreigners forms part of this major obligation.”101 
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The GIA, by “describing the Algerian ruling regime as apostate and infidel,” 
wanted to encourage people to turn against the government. Hafez admits, “These terms 
are very strong symbols deeply rooted in Islamic traditions and full of implied meaning. 
They suggest mutual negation, irreconcilability, and total war. In Islam, infidelism – non-
belief in creator - is one of the greatest sins one can commit, especially when ruling 
among the Muslim community (umma). The Quran implores Muslims to struggle against 
infidels and promises great suffering toward unbelievers. Apostasy … implies that 
reconciliation with the ruling regime is virtually impossible. In Islam, the punishment of 
an apostate is death; there can be no compromise with apostates unless they repent.”102 
The generalization of the enemy allowed every type of action, and thus gave free reign to 
all armed bands claiming to follow it. 
The GIA insisted the “jihad is an Islamic obligation until judgment day” and saw 
the war as a religious one imposed by God on Muslims. As the insurgency developed, the 
GIA portrayed its struggle also as one against historic “enemies” of Islam - the West, 
Crusaders, and Jews.103 Wiktorowicz notices that in doing so, the GIA “turned against 
foreign nationals, issuing a statement warning all foreigners to leave the country.”104 
Habeck argues that in transferring the struggle into the conflict of values, the GIA 
combined the revolutionary principles of combating the people’s fear through terror and 
Sayyid Qutb’s redefined concept of al Tawhid, the divine and absolute unity of God. The 
GIA extremists gave tawhid political implications and used it to justify their violent acts. 
The principle of the government of God projects Islam to the core of the political 
arena.105 Thus, “the GIA went to war against all the social groups, which involuntarily or 
deliberately, ensured that the regime continued in power.”106 
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5. GIA Action Repertoires 
Takeyeh states that the action repertoires of the GIA “were equally questionable: 
using violence to challenge the notion of the regime’s invincibility and spark a mass 
uprising.”107 Hence, the great number of urban terrorist acts and the indiscriminate 
assassination of persons viewed as belonging the regime‘s sociopolitical basis: 
bureaucrats, journalists, foreigners, teachers, magistrates, and even the mothers, wives, 
and sisters of members of security forces. 
The GIA used terrorist tactics and staged a series of ruthless atrocities to 
intimidate much of the population and ensure its domination over the Islamist movement. 
The young men were at stake as the civil war began. They were subject to the Algerian 
army, dependent on the draft system on the one hand, and to GIA mudjihidins trying to 
weaken new intakes of conscripts, on the other. Martinez suggests that the violent acts 
and massacres committed against national service members were “aimed at polarizing 
allegiances and choices,” however, in consequence, “strengthened the troops’ solidarity 
and forced the national serviceman to stay in the army, as the only protection available 
against GIA reprisal.”108 
The war tactics of the GIA seemed unstoppable; its spectacular attacks, 
highlighted in the media, combined with a rapidly expanding war economy, attracted a 
large number of Islamist sympathizers and the suburban Islamist armed bands towards it, 
desiring to fight the regime’s security forces.109 The ruthless techniques of violence, 
which were used by the GIA with the aim to mobilize an ambivalent Algerian population 
against the unpopular regime, however, failed and turned this population against the GIA. 
6. Targets 
Drake believes, even as “the ideology of a terrorist group sets out the moral 
parameters within they operate, the selection of targets is also affected by the effect or 
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effects which they wish their violence to achieve.” The GIA leaders hoped that by 
attacking targets they had chosen they would “maximize the pressure upon the 
psychological target to behave in a certain fashion.”110 What distinguished the radical 
Salafi GIA from other Islamist groups was the acceptability of targeting civilians. 
Wiktorowicz argues that “A stark distinction between supporters and opponents of the 
jihad” allowed the GIA to attack the wide spectrum of targets. He writes that “Opponents 
included noncombatants who were deemed obstacles to the struggle, such as the press, 
academics, secularists, and various civil society leaders.” It also allowed certain GIA 
factions to expand this category to include ordinary Algerians, who through their 
everyday activities were seen as providing tacit approval for the regime. Wiktorowicz 
writes that “school children attending government schools, journalists providing negative 
coverage of Islamist actions, the leaders of civil society organizations that sponsored non-
Islamist causes and anyone not actively supporting the jihad were judged apostates and 
legitimate targets of violence.”111 
a. Attacks on Regime Elements 
Political violence in Algeria initially took the form of standard 
revolutionary clashes with security forces and assassinations of police officers, military 
personnel, regime officials and secular activists.112 Since the beginning of the struggle, 
thousands of police officers and conscripts were killed in various parts of Algeria – often 
having throats cut or were beheaded. By the mid-1990s, the GIA was responsible for a 
large number of bomb explosions in popular markets, cafes, and other public spaces. The 
GIA, however, refused to distinguish between the Algerian state and those that worked 
for it in one way or another. They became legitimate targets for the organization. The 
GIA violence expanded to government officials, representatives of opposition groups, 
foreigners, journalists, intellectuals, and ordinary civilians killed randomly through 
bombings and deliberately through executions and massacres. The radical Islamists 
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resorted to bloody terror, instilling insecurity that aimed at “a political division of the 
population, between friends and enemies.” 113 GIA strategy of terror continually 
increased the feeling of insecurity and forced people to take sides. 
b. Attack on Civilians 
Attacks against civilians targeted not only ordinary villagers and Algerian 
citizens, but also prominent cultural figures and civil society leaders such as student 
leaders, the director of the Algerian national theater, the head of a feminist organization, 
and many more. They were killed by the GIA for sponsoring ideas that were considered 
in opposition to Islam. Journalist, editors and other member of the press industry were 
also targeted in the offensive on the secular professions.114  
The GIA also resorted to attacks on educational institutions, schools and 
universities because they served the secular government. Wiktorowicz notices that in the 
GIA’s perspective those who “continue their studies are helping the tyrant to ensure 
stability and thereby are not accomplishing the jihad.”115 In 1994, over eighty teachers 
were killed and six hundred schools were attacked, three universities and nine training 
institutes were burned or bombed. Because of such attacks, over 1,000 academics left 
Algeria.116 
Algerian fundamentalists from GIA used a religious decree (fetwa), issued 
by the Egyptian fundamentalist sheikh Muhhamad al-Gazali in June 1993, to legitimize 
killings of Muslim intellectuals as Sharia - decreed executions. In 1993, the GIA alone 
slew twelve leading Algerian intellectuals.117 According to this fetwa, “Every Muslim  
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who pleads for the suspension of the Sharia is an apostate and can be killed. The killing 
of those apostates cannot be prosecuted under Islamic law because this killing is 
justified.”118 
c. Attacks on Foreigners 
The GIA was responsible for great amounts of violence against foreigners 
working in Algeria. The GIA, by attacking foreign groups or individuals that in some 
way represented Western influence or secularism, wanted to “weaken a government 
already heavily in debt, and reduce western cultural influence.” 119 In 1993, the Armed 
Islamic Group issued threats against all foreigners living or working in Algeria to leave 
the country under the penalty of being “killed in cold blood.”120 At least 100 foreigners 
were killed during this conflict; some of them were French monks killed in very horrific 
ways. 
d. Strategic Objectives 
Drake argues that by attacking such a wide spectrum of targets, the GIA 
attempted to attain a number of strategic objectives. Attacks on the educational system 
and its representatives were aimed to disorientate the elite in Algeria and, together with 
more widespread attacks on ordinary civilians, tried to enforce compliance with the 
GIA’s political and religious demands. They also wanted to strengthen obedience to the 
terrorists’ religious principles. GIA’s violence against foreigners aspired to weaken the 
regime and damage the Algerian economy, and promote the terrorists’ cause. Killing 
police officers, soldiers and officials had functional and symbolic values of damaging the 
regime’s material ability to combat the terrorists, thus, demonstrating the weakness of the 
state.121 
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During the first two years of rebellion, the GIA’s violence strengthened 
the terrorists’ hold over the civil population and, consequently, the ability to extract 
support and resources from them. However, Takeyh states that “As the violence evolved, 
the GIA spectacularly miscalculated by turning against small merchants, entrepreneurs 
and petty bourgeoisie who had formed the backbone of the Islamic opposition. The GIA 
activists began to press these groups for funds and operated well-developed racketeering 
schemes. The movement that acclaimed piety and professed to create a virtuous order had 
turned into a violent street gang, provoking an orgy of violence.” In 1997, the GIA 
adopted apocalyptical view of the struggle in which there was no place for neutrality 
“Except for those who are with us, all others are renegades.”122 
e. Liberated Areas - Regulating Behavior by Sharia  
In a series of communiqués beginning in 1994, the GIA attempted to 
enforce political and religious control by regulating the behavior of citizens in its 
strongholds and Algeria in general. Women who did not obey the terrorists’ edicts on 
dress or education were attacked and sometimes killed. In 1995, the GIA ordered the 
wives of men employed by the state to leave their husbands because it deemed the latter 
to be apostates. In January 1996, it threatened to kill young men of draft age if they 
traveled outside their area of residence for an extended period (presumably to prevent 
them from being trained in government military camps). 
In 1996, the GIA threatened to kill those who were engaging in what the 
GIA and other Islamists considered un-Islamic behaviors. This rationale aimed to justify 
vicious assaults against a wide variety of targets. The GIA argued that its religious duty is 
to eliminate “‘those who do not pray, who drink alcohol, take drugs, homosexuals, and 
immodest or debauched women,’” and those who fail to pay the zakat to the GIA. It 
threatened though to kill women who left their homes without wearing a hijab. It also 
prohibited people from going to places of bad reputation such as bars and video stores.123 
Even government mosques were considered off limits, and those who prayed in them 
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were labeled collaborators. In its “liberated zones,” the GIA demanded food supplies, 
contributions, shelter from local inhabitants and direct financial resources to the 
mujahidin until the condition of sufficiency (kifaya) was achieved.124  
The GIA, failing to overthrow the regime, adopted a policy of substitution 
for state institution. Although it did not occupy any city militarily, it remained present 
through whole networks of surveillance and control in urban areas, almost like other 
political criminal organizations. Martinez notices that after four years of ruthless war, the 
GIA’s record produced doubts among the population about the organization’s real 
intentions. The local population, especially Islamist sympathizers subject to the GIA 
emirs, became aware that the liberated areas were just an illusion, that they were more 
like areas deliberately abandoned by the security forces, turned into inaccessible and 
intolerable Islamist ghettos.125 
f. Local Commerce and Illicit Market 
Martinez argues that the establishment of armed Islamist groups in the 
urban districts in 1994 stopped crimes because Islamists did not tolerate interference in 
their territory. The GIA declared war on the criminals, to the satisfaction of the local 
people and especially local petty traders. The criminals were called either to leave the 
area or to work with Islamist Groups.126 Roberts reveals that in fact, the emirs of the GIA 
were actively involved in local level commerce and took an interest in the economic 
activity through smuggling and protection rackets of various kinds.127 The absence of 
security forces or Islamist groups in the urban areas made people unprotected and favored 
organized crime elements. Criminals appeared to be the principal actors on the stage and 
many times they practiced “extortion for the GIA’s benefits.” The traders were the most 
penalized by demands from either Islamists or groups of criminals. For the local 
population, the view of criminals and GIA fighters operating together showed the true 
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nature of local Islamist groups claiming to fight in the name of Armed Islamic Group.128 
Martinez notices that the GIA’s cooperation with criminal bands and assimilation of 
some elements of the GIA into Mafioso activities was used by the Algerian regime as 
propaganda against the group in government’s counter-guerilla struggle.129 
From its beginning, the GIA undertook the campaign of systematic 
demolition of railways, bridges, telephone lines and state enterprises. Control of 
highways became a stake in the rivalry between the AIS and GIA. Through the fake 
roadblocks, the GIA tried to mobilize the population against an unpopular regime, and 
what is more, it controlled a great number of commercial vehicle traffic that gave the 
organization “an assured income, which made its lightning rise possible.”130 
Since the GIA in 1993 won the sympathy of the ex-FIS voters who saw 
them as defenders of the Islamic cause, expansion of the group seemed appealing. 
Martinez notices that “the first generation of fighters, considered as heroes, protectors 
and avengers in their home areas, were succeeded by bands whose activities ran counter 
to the interests of the ‘cause.’” Forced to extract resources from their environment to 
remain in the field, GIA focused on “extortion from petty traders.” In 1995, the GIA 
succeeded in holding the monopoly of extortion, eliminating other Islamist groups from 
these businesses.131  
The armed Islamist groups consolidated their positions around the most 
dynamical economic zones, which derived their wealth from the informal economy or 
illicit dealings. The protection rackets went so far that petty traders stopped supplying 
them and a local counter resistance emerged, through formation of groups of patriots and 
militiamen in 1995. This led to many brutal killings of bakers, grocers, hardware  
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merchants and jewelers, causing an exodus of those trades. Weakened by the loss of the 
essential part of their financial resources, the GIA pushed their districts into bloody 
terror.132 
They cut two young people’s throats and placed their heads at the 
crossroads. That is not good, that. I think that if they go on doing that, 
people won’t be with them any more. Let them kills the others, the thieves 
(criminal and political leaders), but they shouldn’t cut people’s 
throats…They cut you up into pieces as if you were a sheep. I tell you, 
people are going to turn against them if that continues. (Petty trader, 40 
years old, Algiers suburbs, 1994)133 
D. MASSACRES 
In 1997, the Armed Islamic Group committed large-scale ruthless massacres, 
which drew international attention to the civil war in Algeria. International media and 
organizations described these massacres as indiscriminate, senseless and 
incomprehensible acts of random butchery. Kalyvas notices that they overwhelmingly 
targeted civilians in Islamist strongholds who at one point supported Islamists, and 
provided them with aid and shelter. Massacres were concentrated in Algiers and towns to 
the southwest, including the area named the “triangle of death” - Medea, Blida, and Ain 
Defla, all of which constituted the geographic backbone of support for Islamism. These 
massacres featured the most barbaric forms of brutality, and included night raids against 
villages and small towns. The attackers rarely used bombs or firearms during these 
attacks. They killed whole families, including babies and elderly, “in a most brutal way, 
usually hacking them to death or slicing their throats, using knives, machetes and axes. In 
some cases corpses were mutilated, houses set on fire and women abducted to be raped 
and then killed.”134 
Hafez argues that the shift from targeting selected categories of civilians to the 
mass butchery of villages and hamlets was part and parcel to the gradual radicalization of 
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the struggle. Exclusive, anti-system organizations, such as the GIA, “often lose touch 
with political reality” and “do not readily accept the idea of ‘neutrality,’ thus leading to a 
broad categorization of legitimate targets. Anyone perceived as either supporting an 
‘unjust’ social order or opposing the legitimacy of total war is part of the problem and 
hence fair game.”135 
The eruption of civilian massacres started in 1996 with the new leadership of 
Antar Zouabri. The new emir of the GIA initiated his “leadership by issuing a foreboding 
fatwa that charged the entire society with apostasy, ” thus authorizing “attacks against 
any Algerian who did not join or aid the GIA, including other armed Islamist groups and 
dissident GIA factions operating independently of the central leadership.” According to 
the GIA doctrine, those that did not assist the GIA “are condemned as apostates and are 
therefore legitimate targets of jihad.” This position was made public in a GIA 
communiqué posted in an Algiers suburb in 1997: “There is no neutrality in the war we 
are waging. With the exception of those who are with us, all the others are apostates and 
deserve to die.”136 Those who did not want to provide support became a legitimate target 
of the GIA attacks. 
Kalyvas argues that massacres perpetrated by Islamist guerrillas in the Algerian 
Civil War on noncombatants were not random and thus were dissimilar from massacres 
perpetrated in most civil wars. The majority of these massacres were selective and 
targeted specific neighborhoods, individuals and families who participated in the 
government-sponsored militias, which were formed to protect secluded regions from 
radical Islamists. Other massacres targeted the families of AIS and GIA members who 
had abandoned the armed struggle in 1997. Most of the massacres of 1997 targeted 
former guerrilla supporters and “Islamists sympathizers who had either abandoned the 
rebels or were getting ready to.”137  
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The GIA emir Abu al-Moudhir argued in response to accusations of 
indiscriminate violence that: 
It is clear that there is no indiscriminate killing. Our fighters only kill 
those who deserve to die. We say to those who accuse us of indiscriminate 
killing that we will fight those traitors who have gone over to the taghout - 
Islamic government. We do no more, than carry out the wishes of God and 
the Prophet. When you hear of killings and throat-slitting in a town or a 
village, you should know it is a matter of the death of government 
partisans, or else it is the application of GIA communiqués ordering [us] 
to do good and combat evil.138  
Civilian populations that withdrew their support from the GIA were viewed as 
apostates and became “the enemies of our fighters, from the youngest of their children to 
the oldest of their elderly.”139 In a communiqué of September 1997 GIA stated that: 
The infidelism and apostasy of this hypocrite nation that turned away from 
backing and supporting the mujahidin will not bend our determination and 
will not hurt us at all, God willing….All the killing and slaughter, the 
massacres, the displacement [of people], the burnings, and the kidnappings 
…are an offering to God.140 
The GIA lost the ability to control those who earlier “protected and supported 
them” and wanted to punish the villagers whom they accused of defecting to the 
government. Kalyvas believes that atrocities perpetrated by the GIA during these 
massacres “created an atmosphere of terror, where people feared not just being killed, but 
being killed in a particularly brutal way.”141 The expanding violence against civilians led 
to greater defections to the regime, principally in the form of anti-insurgents militias. 
This response further enraged GIA militants and led them to take revenge, even against 
those who at one point had offered moral, financial, and physical support. 
In February 2002, Algeria’s security forces succeeded in killing Antar Zoubari, 
the sixth commander of the GIA and the purveyor of mass slaughter in Algeria. His 
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death, however, did not bring about an end to violence. On the contrary, his successor, al-
Rashid Abu Turab, issued a communiqué promising more “blood and blood, destruction 
and destruction,” escalating the violence by carrying out a number of massacres and 
random bombings in public places.142 
E. LOSING SUPPORT 
Some elements of the GIA broke away from the organization because of 
politically aimless activities, increasingly indistinguishable from banditry, like organized 
plundering on passing traffic and the operation of protection rackets. Other elements 
broke away from it as the growing dissatisfaction spread among Algerians with Islamist 
ideology and the deviation from its original purposes. In 1995 and 1996, some of the 
militias in the GIA began to breakaway from the group, claiming the GIA had “deviated 
from the correct path of jihad” and committed crimes against innocent people. Two 
former FIS leaders, who joined GIA in 1994, withdrew their group, accusing the GIA of 
killing women and children. Others defected after the GIA executed former FIS leader 
and a member of the GIA’s consultative council- Muhammed Said, and Mahfouz Tajeen 
– the former leader of GIA. Disregarding with Zoubari policies of attacking civilians, the 
GIA emir of the second region Hassan Hattab withdrew from the organization’s 
leadership, and receiving support from a number Salafi figures in global jihad movement, 
including Osama Ben Laden, founded in 1998 a new group – Salafi Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC), that dissociated it from massacres. The GSPC attracted dissidents 
from the GIA as well as the FIS, rejected the amnesty and has continued to fight.143 
In the autumn of 1997, the FIS decided to abandon the civil war, and the AIS 
announced a unilateral ceasefire. The ceasefire reduced the overall level of political 
violence and fragmented the armed Islamic groups. Brutal attacks against civilians 
perpetrated by the GIA, however, undermined and eroded the pragmatic and political 
position of the FIS. It was not seen any longer as a legitimate representative of the 
Algerian people and, in their eyes, jihad “became increasingly associated with atrocities.” 
                                                 
142 Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres,” 53. 
143 Wiktorowicz, “Centrifugal Tendencies in the Algerian Civil War,” 9. 
 46
Because of the massacres, popular opinion in Algeria turned against the Islamists. Even 
those who supported the FIS after a few years of sheltering the movement-either 
willingly or through coercion, discovered they were wrong.144  
The GIA violence, as well as the economic problems, was one of the leading 
events that consolidated the Algerian regime to the final defeat of the guerrillas. Martinez 
argues that while the military had succeeded in eroding Islamist electoral support, 
“misunderstanding of the nature of the problem remained ineffective against doctrine that 
had brought it about.” Even though the regime’s reconquest of the country in 1998 had 
risen against the limitations of the war economy, the whole spectrum of political, 
economic and social conditions that gave legitimacy to the Islamist mobilization 
remained unresolved. The latter’s revival of the economy and prosecution of economic 
reforms undermined the base of support for Islamist organizations from the Algerian 
youth.145 By building bridges to the moderate Islamists, the military moved finally 
towards a democratic polity and ended the civil war that had brutalized an entire 
generation of the Algerian population. They shifted attention away from ideology toward 
economic progress, tapping into the desire of many Algerians for peace and 
reconstruction.146 
Martinez finds out after six years of civil war, the Algerian government succeeded 
in turning a conflict between Islamist guerrillas and the security forces into a ruthless 
struggle between the GIA and the AIS. In parallel with the “total war” against the armed 
Islamic groups, there was a gradual absorption and assimilation of the Islamist guerrillas 
into a society and the machinery of the state. A victory of the AIS over the GIA, helped 
by the backing of the army, hastened this process and confirmed that violence was 
viewed as a means to achieve political power.147  
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The communes under the GIA emirs sank into terror and monotony. The Islamist 
groups in urban areas became a burden and nuisance for the local population who 
realized their true nature and no longer saw its interest in supporting them. The GIA 
methods have been a “massive embarrassment for the FIS” and for the Islamist 
movement. The GIA’s “appalling acts of violence have regularly been cited in the 
Algerian media as evidence of the barbaric impulses of Islamists in general,” thus making 
any dialogue with the FIS not feasible.148 The majority of Algerians, who in 1990s 
supported the FIS and promises of political and economic reforms, had no desire to bring 
to power so called utopian radicals, especially once the violence and corruption escalated. 
F. SELF-DEFENSE MILITIAS 
Bard O’Neil argues that the insurgents’ dependence on terrorism as a way to gain 
“popular support runs the risk of its prolongation and intensification, which may be 
counterproductive.” Prolonged acts of terrorism “can disrupt traditional life styles, 
making life increasingly miserable for the general population.” Failure to replace 
terrorism with more effective military operations can create the impression that 
insurgents have lost the initiative and that their chances of success are remote. Even 
worse, there is a danger that as it continues, terrorism will become indiscriminate. If this 
occurs, insurgents can end up alienating potential domestic and international 
supporters.149 The GIA’s indiscriminate violence generated incentives for collaboration 
with the regime, thus generating defection instead of deterring it. The GIA suffered 
defections and decreased popular support because of its indiscriminate actions. As the 
conflict persisted, people who were initially sympathetic to the GIA’s cause became 
alienated by GIA atrocities and could no longer endure the material costs of the 
insurgency. Many stopped giving support; others turned against the movement. After a  
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few years of sheltering the movement, either willingly or because of coercion, some 
residents in and around Islamist strongholds agreed to form government–sponsored 
militias.150 
Kalyvas argues that the local militias or paramilitary groups of patriots “are the 
answer of incumbents to protracted guerrilla warfare.” Those militias allow regimes “to 
reduce information costs,” and “to cut warfare costs.” Unfortunately, emergence of 
militias “almost always cause an escalation of violence.” Local conflicts, personal 
animosities, family disputes and desire for revenge may induce defection from the 
insurgents’ groups.151 
Martinez believes that the systematical elimination of the MIA and later AIS, and 
ex-FIS activists, allowed the regime forces to abandon willingly the municipalities 
previously supporting the FIS, leaving armed groups of GIA that “did not fight in the 
name of the party, but waged jihad in the name of GIA.” The tactics of ‘letting them rot’ 
allowed isolation of the Greater Algiers communes and transformed those areas into 
Islamist’s ghettoes under the GIA control. Some areas in the interior also remained under 
the control the GIA. Emirs who had a monopoly of violence there consequently instilled 
the feeling of insecurity among the population. Thus the army created conditions that 
forced people “to organize their own defense when they were exasperated by the costs of 
providing for the ‘Emirs’” of the GIA.152 Formation of these groups of legitimate 
defense was a part of the regime’s strategic reorientation of the counterinsurgency 
campaign. Since the end of 1994, the militias tolerated by the security forces and 
legalized in 1997 became active participants in anti-guerrilla warfare (their strength was 
estimated to be around 100,000 men).153 
Three types of militias appeared during the Algerian civil war that fit a pattern of 
anti-guerrilla warfare. Firstly, self-defense groups, that were established in Kabylia as a 
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response to threats from the Islamists. They were “the right arms of political parties and 
regional associations,” protecting their villages against Islamist bands. These self-defense 
groups were tolerated but independent from the authority of security forces. There were 
also private militias created to protect local eminent personalities and their interests. 
Finally, there were combat type units of patriots, equipped by the government and 
working with security forces. They consisted mainly “of people threatened by the 
Islamists, or relatives of victims of the Islamists groups,” and generally operated in the 
interior to look for the terrorists. Driven by a desire for revenge, those militias were 
extremely effective; however, they were also accused of many excesses.154 In addition to 
guarding their villages from attacks, Kalyvas notices, they became “increasingly involved 
in full-fledged military operations as auxiliary corps of the army.”155 
Now things have changed, it’s no longer the Moudjahidin who cut off 
heads, it’s the militiamen. If the militiamen go on like that, in two or three 
years they will have killed all the Moudjahidin.156 
The local processes of violence escalation were motivated by revenge: “If they 
[terrorists] kill one of my relatives I will kill their entire families; this is the only 
language that terrorists understand.”157 Kalyvas notices that in Algerian rural areas, these 
acts of revenge often became a tribal war. Some of the tribe’s members served as 
soldiers, police officers, or worked for the government - that made tribes connected to the 
state. Any death of a tribe member, killed by Islamists, caused the spiral of tribal 
violence. Tribes armed by regime security forces then organized a revenge operation 
against those who had “children in the guerrilla.”158 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the implications of the Armed Islamic Group’s 
indiscriminate, large-scale violence and its impact on the Algerian Civil War. This 
analysis identified several relevant factors regarding the genesis of violence and relations 
between the GIA armed bands and local population. It specifically considered how and 
where the GIA originated and the conditions that facilitated its expansion. It also 
considered its role within local settings, and how these factors were affecting the degrees 
of GIA violence. 
The first section of the chapter demonstrated how political conditions within 
Algerian society allowed the radical elements to rise to the fore and affect the current 
settings. The second section explored the nature of the Armed Islamic Group and its 
increasing violence against civilians as a part of a strategy intended to maximize civilian 
support and prevent civilian defection. The third section examined the outcomes these 
acts of violence produced. The most significant result of violence was civilian defection 
to the regime in a way of creating self-defense and counter insurgency militias. People in 
Algeria, exhausted by the pointless and ruthless violence, wanted to put an end to it and 
carry on with their lives. They recognized the longer the violence has gone on, the less it 
has had to do with the national political objectives of the initiators of the rebellion, and 
the less it appeared to be oriented by comprehensible political purposes of any kind.159 
This analysis argues that indiscriminate, mass casualty violence against civilians 
is counterproductive. The GIA atrocities turned popular support dramatically against the 
Islamic movement and created incentives for collaboration with the regime, thus 
generating defection instead of deterring it. 
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III. CASE STUDY: VIOLENCE IN THE WAR IN IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the case study of the use of violence by Salafi jihadists in 
the ongoing war in Iraq. More specifically, it will address the most deadly and ruthless 
terrorist organization among insurgent groups in Iraq: al Qaeda in the land of Two 
Rivers. 
The al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has claimed responsibility for multiple beheadings, 
kidnappings, and suicide bombings against foreigners, coalition forces, and the Iraqi 
police force and army. They have also committed these crimes against many civilians. 
This group is responsible for an outbreak of violence that started in autumn 2003, which 
led to the civil war between the Sunni and Shia. Atrocities perpetrated by this group 
against Sunni civilians were one of the main reasons for the Sunni uprising in the al 
Anbar province. The Sunni rebellion against AQI, that started in the summer of 2006, has 
radically improved security in the most violent and hostile province in a “Sunni Triangle” 
in Iraq–the al Anbar Province. David Kilcullen notices that in Ramadi, Hit, Tikrit, 
Fallujah, Baquba, Baghdad and other cities and villages “the rate of civilian deaths has 
dropped precipitously, and overall attacks are down far below historic trends, to almost 
nothing in some places.” The local Sunni tribes have formed a neighborhood watch 
(Concerned Local Citizens), have provided security in their own community, and have 
joined with the Iraqi police under government control and started to cooperate with local 
Iraqi army units. Kilcullen also believes, the tribal leaders recognized that “the extremists 
were leading them on a path to destruction, and have seized the opportunity to dump the 
terrorists” and join the political process to be in charge once U.S. forces leave.160 
The first section of this chapter considers the origins and the position that al 
Qaeda in Iraq holds among the Sunni insurgency. The second section explores the tactics 
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and methods used by this group in its war in Iraq, predominantly against Iraqi civilians. 
The last section considers the nature of the relationships between al Qaeda and Sunni 
Iraqis, and how the logic of al Qaeda violence affected the process of the al Anbar 
Awakening. 
B. THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ 
Insurgency in Iraq consists of various groups that have taken up arms against the 
United States occupation in Iraq and the new Iraqi security forces since April 2003.161 
Some intelligence reports estimate the number of these groups from 40 to more than 100. 
Sharing “a common goal of ending the foreign military presence in Iraq,” these groups, 
however, “are varied and diverse, with shifting allegiances, configurations, funding 
sources, strategies and aims.162  
Loretta Napoleoni finds insurgency in Iraq as a very “complex force” consisting 
of “independent Iraqi jihadist groups that gravitate towards al Qaeda, Islamo-nationalist 
and Ba’ath party resistance fighters opposing Coalition forces, fully armed and active 
ethnic and religious militias” like Shite Muktada al Sadr “Jaish al Mahdi,” and “an 
endless stream of foreign suicide bombers.”163 Cordesman states that the most important 
and strong elements of insurgency consisted of former regime elements (Ba’athists) 
groups as well as extreme Salafis from al Qaeda.164 
The main objective of the Iraqi Sunni insurgency is to force the United States to 
leave Iraq, replace the current Iraqi government dominated by the Shia (and considered 
                                                 
161 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Insurgency in Iraq,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 3 
(autumn 2003): 2. 
162 Human Rights Watch, “A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgents Groups in Iraq,” 
Volume 17, No.9 (E), (October 2005), 13. 
163 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, 188. 
164 Anthony H. Cordesman and Patrick Baetjer, “The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at the end 
of 2004,” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 
<www.csis.org/features/iraq_devinsurgengy.pdf.> [Accessed 23 September 2007]. 
 53
illegitimate because it is backed by the United States), and stop the Shia from coming 
into power by generating chaos and anarchy.165 
Most importantly, according to Human Rights Watch, the insurgent groups “have 
different views on the conduct of hostilities and the legitimate targets of military attack. 
Certain insurgent groups have repeatedly admitted, even boasted, about their role in 
abductions, executions, attacks on religious or ethnic groups, and suicide bombings in 
populated areas. Videos they produced of beheadings left no doubt as to their 
responsibility for the most serious crimes of war. Other groups have concentrated their 
attacks more on military targets, though they still may be responsible for unlawful attacks 
against civilians.”166 
Cordesman notices that the insurgents shifted their main effort to Iraqi civilian 
targets that were more vulnerable and had far more political impact. Much of their 
activity consists of bombings of soft civilian targets, designed largely to provoke a more 
intense civil war or halt the development of an effective Iraqi government.167 The 
insurgents’ remarkable ability to terrorize residents, killing those who help Coalition 
forces while intimidating others, is their biggest and most effective weapon. 
Different members of the Iraqi population “have different views of the 
insurgency. Some oppose the insurgency generally, or the way it is being conducted, 
while others have not joined the insurgency but support its aims. Sunni who criticized the 
insurgency or have not actively supported it were seen as allied with the new government 
and thus “risk themselves becoming a target of insurgent groups.”168 
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C. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ (AQI) 
1. AQI Emergence 
In April 2003, Iraq became a central front in the Salafi global holy war when Bin 
Laden called for jihadis fighters to join the fight there. Through an underground network 
that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi established (with indigenous Islamic radicals from Ansar al 
Sunna), endless streams of foreign fighters started to arrive to Iraq. Created in 
Afghanistan, Zarqawi’s organization Tawhid al Jihad was moved to Iraq following the 
United States invasion. In July 2003, Tawhid al Jihad began its bloody and indiscriminate 
attacks through devastating bombings of the Jordanian Embassy and United Nations 
headquarters in Baghdad, followed by the killing of Shia leader Mohammed Baqr al 
Hakim and a ruthless campaign of suicide operations against police stations and 
recruitment centers. Shultz and Dew believes that “Zarqawi’s deadly mass attacks … 
catapulted him to international notoriety as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s Salafi jihad 
operations in Iraq.” On October 17, 2004 in a communiqué issued by Tawhid al Jihad, 
Zarqawi announced that his movement joined together under the banner of Al Qaeda in a 
pledge of allegiance. He was appointed by Osama Bin Laden as Emir of Al Qaeda in the 
country of Two Rivers “to carry out Jihad in the name of God.”169 
Among Sunni insurgent groups, al Qaeda has played a leading role in terrorist 
activities in Iraq; however, Brian Fishman argues, it was never “the center of gravity of 
the Iraqi insurgency” and Al Zarqawi did not control the insurgency in Iraq. Foreign 
fighters have been a very small minority of the entire resistance.170 Andrew Tilgman 
states that “Even if the manpower and number of attacks attributed to AQI have been 
exaggerated … many observers argue that what is uniquely dangerous about the group is 
not its numbers, but the spectacular nature of its strikes. While homegrown Sunni and 
Shiite militias engage for the most part in tit-for-tat violence to forward sectarian ends, 
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AQI’s methods are presumed to be different - more dramatic, more provocative, and 
having a greater ripple effect on the country’s fragile political environment,” and have 
“the most destabilizing political and strategic affects.”171 According to United States 
intelligence assessments, AQI “may not account for most of the violence in Iraq, but it is 
the organization responsible for the highest profile attacks, which serve as a primary 
accelerant to the underlying sectarian conflict.”172 
Al Zarqawi’s death didn’t change much in the way of al Qaeda activity in Iraq. 
Abdallah bin Rashid al-Baghdadi, the emir of the Mujahidin Shura Council, restated his 
determination to continue Zarqawi’s jihad against Iraq’s Shia. Fishman notices that “The 
increase of sectarian violence in Iraq since Zarqawi’s death” reinforced this tendency.173 
Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia remained the leading jihadist group and continued its 
campaign to divide Iraq along sectarian borders and established a stronghold within 
Sunni area. It built alliances with smaller factions and merged with various organizations 
to “present itself as an Iraqi, rather than foreign organization.” Al Qaeda jihadists build 
their support base on the growing popularity of the puritanical Salafi strain of Islam and 
escalated inner Sunni rivalries. Jihadis presented themselves as the defenders of 
persecuted Sunnis and seemed “ideologically better placed to defend Sunni Arabs against 
hostile [Shia] militias, than their more moderate nationalist rivals.”174 
2. AQI Objectives 
Carter Malkasian argues that jihadis from the al Qaeda Organization in the Land 
of Two Rivers “sought to compel a U.S. withdrawal; but only as a means of creating an 
anarchical environment conducive to supporting terrorist activity in the region,” and 
extend the jihad to the secular states bordering with Iraq. Finally, “they hoped to establish 
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a new Islamic Caliphate” with borders reaching far beyond Mesopotamia. In order to 
achieve these goals and to be successful, jihadis had to control the Iraqi population 
through either support or coercion.175 Based in the Sunni tribal areas, AQI was able “to 
sustain spectacular anti-Shi’ite bombing campaign, which, along with the Sunnis’ historic 
disdain for the Shi’ite majority, created the conditions for the … civil war.”176 Kilcullen 
believes that al Qaeda’s “‘pitch’ to the Sunni community is based on the argument that 
only al Qa’ida stands between the Sunnis and a Shi’a-led genocide.” The sectarian aspect 
used by AQI that “promotes a belief by Sunnis that they will be permanent victims in the 
new Iraq is one of the most significant drivers of violence. This belief creates space for 
terrorist groups including AQI, and these groups in turn drive a cycle of sectarian 
violence that keeps Iraq unstable and prevents U.S. disengaging.”177 
“In spite of ideological differences, al Qaeda’s jihadists and Sunni resistance 
generally cooperated against the Coalition occupation.”178 Jihadis rejected, however, any 
compromise with the Coalition or the Iraqi government; moreover, their goal to found a 
religious Islamic state that might export terrorism evidently threatened the United States’ 
national security. 
3. AQI Tactics 
a. Violence 
To maintain control over the population, intimidate opponents and create a 
constant climate of violence and chaos, AQI’s takfiris used terror as a necessary part of 
insurgent campaign to gain popular support.179 Thus the jihadis carried out brutal 
terrorist attacks on the Iraqis. Abu Mosab al Zarqawi launched a series of attacks on the 
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Shia leadership, holy Shia sites, and wider Shia population. Bruce Riedel argues that Al 
Zarqawi’s action was a part of a considered strategy planned before the invasion. 
Targeting Shias isolated and exposed U.S. forces to attack. Zarqawi “wanted the arena to 
be cleared of any rival before the American army withdraws from Iraq so the 
Mujahideens would gain mastery over Iraq, set up Sharia courts, suppress heresy and all 
the things that are repudiated by Islam.”180 To disrupt the election scheduled for January 
30, 2005 “Zarqawi declared war on the election and democracy itself, promising a ‘fierce 
war’ against all ‘apostates’ who vote in the election. Moreover, he declared a bitter war 
against democracy and all those who seek to enact it.’”181 
Some chieftains of Sunni tribes believe that AQI used Iraq and the Iraqis 
as a means to achieve their goals.182 The organization knew the U.S. would leave 
eventually, but AQI ultimately must fight Iraqis and destroy Iraqi institutions in order to 
prevail. Indiscriminate and large scale use of violence against civilian Iraqis, however, 
“may be the source of their own [al Qaeda in Iraq] demise.”183 It alienated the majority 
of the Iraqi population and, most importantly, caused opposition to the AQI’s tactic 
among the foreign support base. An open letter, published by Kuwaiti Sheikh Wali al 
Tabtabai (variously described as an Islamist, Salafist and conservative) in the Kuwaiti 
newspaper Al Watan on 27 September 2007 gave the opinion of a significant section of 
Muslims on AQI’s terrorist actions: 
Al-Qaeda’s shameful operations [in Iraq] violated the genuine concept of 
Jihad and overstepped its real significance, since they were aimed at 
kidnappings, manslaughters, bombings in public places and at targeting 
mosques and innocent Sunnis and Shias.184 
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b. Mass Casualties Suicide Missions 
Mike Davis argues that suicide car bombings have been one of the AQI’s 
most preferable tactics that still “continue to devastate Shia and Sunni neighborhoods.” 
The jihadis “stroked savagely, and at will, against Shiite areas of Baghdad and Shiite 
pilgrims on the highways to the south of the capital,” as well as against dissident Sunni 
tribes in al Anbar province. They even used “children as a decoy to get through a military 
checkpoint and then exploded the car with the kids still at the back seats.” Some of those 
suicide car bombers attacks were coordinated with assailants in suicide vests. An 
estimated 78,000 Iraqis were killed by several thousand vehicle bombings between 
March 2003 and June 2006, and these numbers continue to grow.185 Robert Pape 
believes that the tactic of suicide bombings, which al Qaeda constantly uses against 
civilians, is “rational in that it helps Islamic terrorist groups achieve their goals.”186 
The Al Qaeda terror campaign in Iraq centered mostly on suicide 
missions. Napoleoni reveals that Ayman al Zawahiri, the al Qaeda main ideologue, 
“merged the concepts of martyrdom and suicide into a terrorist technique” in the late 
1980s. Suicide missions play the role of tactical deception in the jihad struggle. Killing 
infidels is not a murder; it is a path to heaven. However, the legitimacy of suicide 
missions is a source of great debate in the Muslim world, especially when innocent 
Muslims become victims. To explain the killings of hundreds of innocents Muslims, 
women and children, al Zawahiri and al Zarqawi used the same concept of “priority for 
jihad.” Slaughtering of fellow people is necessary, justified and permitted in pursuit of 
jihad. To justify the random killings of innocent Iraqis in a wave of suicide attacks, 
Muslim victims were treated also as martyrs.187 
Al Zarqawi started the campaign of indiscriminate suicide car bombings, 
that mainly affected Iraqi civilians (mostly Shia), because this type of campaign was 
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cheaper that selective violence. The majority of suicide bombers were made up mostly of 
foreigners, who came to Iraq to “join the fight and to ultimately meet their end as human 
explosives.” Most of these volunteers “have no military training or guerilla experience, 
nor even used a weapon.”188 Tactically, this strategy aimed to maximize their usefulness. 
Mohammad Hafez believes, Zarqawi understood that “it is less expensive to recruit and 
prepare suicide bombers than guerrilla fighter who must be armed and sheltered over and 
extended period of time. Human bombs conduct their missions with greater versatility 
and accuracy,” and their “psychological impact is much more potent on the target 
audience,” highlighting “the determination of the insurgents” that are “‘not deterred by 
death.’”189 In Iraq, al Qaeda had no time and infrastructure to train them, and the best 
possible option to use them was to “make them blow themselves up in the crowded area.” 
They were treated by al Qaeda as a weapon, not as people or jihadis.190 More 
importantly, Jihadis in Iraq that killed indiscriminately “in pursuit for a better 
government for [the] Iraqi population” have seen themselves as mujahedins or martyrs, 
not terrorists.191 
The issue of innocent Muslims that became victims of jihadis’ 
indiscriminate terror of car bombings, however, alienated support for Islamist armed 
groups in Iraq, as well as across the Muslim world. Many condemned suicide missions 
because they ended up killing fellow Muslims. 
c. Mass Atrocities 
Cordesman finds that al Qaeda in Iraq noticed that “atrocities like 
desecrating corpses and beheadings were effective political and psychological weapons.” 
Even if the result of this tactic provoked hostility and anger, AQI deliberately used it to 
“create conditions that can drive the West away, undermine secular and moderate 
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regimes in the Arab and Islamic world, and create the conditions under which they can 
create ‘Islamic’ states.” The “more horrifying” attacks were better for the cause, because 
they got more media attention. Killing innocent hostages, causing mass casualties 
through bombings in crowds, “desecrating corpses, beheading people, and similar acts of 
violence” grabbed the greater attention of the world media.192 
Michael Totten, visiting Sunni Iraqis in ar Ramadi, the capital of al Anbar 
Province, noticed that the citizens in Ramadi were terribly scared of Al Qaeda. For any 
kind of misbehavior AQI “would show up at their houses in the middle of the night, rape 
women” in front of their husbands, kill children, and forbid them to help the 
Americans.193 Toten notices that “AQI killed civilians by castrating them, stuffing their 
genitals in their mouths, and cutting off their heads.” In response to one of the Sunni 
sheikh’s (Jassim) open cooperation with U.S. forces, al Qaeda “launched a massive attack 
on his area.” Jihadis “set houses on fire” and “dragged people through the streets behind 
pickup trucks.” What is more, they kidnapped and tortured children. Finally, “after 
several young people were beheaded by al Qaeda,” the imams from mosques in Ramadi 
screamed jihad against al Qaeda and started to fight jihadis. 
Toten notices that after a time al Qaeda met resistance from the Iraqis who 
“rose up and began killing the terrorists on their own.” People “reached the tipping point 
where they just could not take any more.”194 Citizens of Ramadi formed “an alliance 
with the previously detested United States Army and Marine Corps and purged the 
terrorists from their lands.”195 
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d. Kidnappings 
In May 2004, Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his Islamist group started a 
series of brutal executions of hostages by beheading them, which became a common 
method of AQI. Jason Burke points out that even though Zarqawis’ actions “seemed to be 
psychotic … there was method to his madness.” He was “deliberately trying to shock his 
audience” by executing hostages in a way of a “ritualized slaughter,” videotaping it, and 
then showing it to the public through the internet or TV. Using camcorders and the 
internet, Burke argues that Zarqawi “mounted an international media event at the tactical 
level that had tremendous strategic impact.” Al Zarqawi hoped to strike fear into the Iraqi 
populace and weaken the resolve of those who might support the Coalition forces in Iraq. 
This terrorists’ action also had tremendous cultural and symbolic significance for the 
audience. “Al Zarqawi … understood that violence affects not just victims, but witnesses 
too.” The target audience “for this statement was not the European and American publics, 
coalition forces or international workers but the millions of Muslims.”196 Napoleoni 
believes that kidnapping and beheading hostages was one of many strategies designated 
to build Zarqawi’s status in Iraq.197 
Fishman writes that Abu Musab al Zarqawi “used public statements 
released online to convey determination, ideological fervor, and strategic purpose to 
followers, enemies, and pole-sitters. These statements provided strategic context for al 
AIQ’s attacks, which might otherwise be perceived as simple acts of sadism rather than 
military instruments designed to achieve specific outcomes.”198 
e. Imposing Sharia 
In the areas that al Qaeda took control of, still other civilians were targeted 
for engaging in what the AQI considered un-Islamic behaviors. Jihadis did not allow 
people to cut their hair, “forced men to grow beards,” forbid smoking and “broke 
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people’s fingers if they were seen smoking a cigarette,” prohibited girls to attend school, 
and what is more, “dragged people outside the city and shot them in the head” for any 
misbehavior. Toten believes, “Once they [jihadis] started acting like that AQI could only 
establish a safe haven by using terrorism against the local civilians.”199 One of the Iraqi 
resistance groups, the Islamic Army in Iraq, “criticized Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi, the amir 
of the state of Iraq [the umbrella for al Qaeda in Mesopotamia], for ‘banning the 
[satellite] dish and for ordering the woman to wear the veil,’ making this ‘one of the 19 
constants,’ since the conditions through which the country was going made the veiled 
woman subject to arrest and this prompted the sisters to give up the veil in places where 
they face such tribulations.”200 
The imposition of a strict interpretation of Islamic law and code of 
conduct, however, occurred to be counter-productive and ended up alienating the Sunni 
population from jihadis. 
4. AQI’s Mobilizing Structures and Support 
To maintain effective operations, al Qaeda jihadis required the support of all the 
local resistance groups, including secular nationalist and tribal members. The whole 
spectrum of the Sunni insurgency supported foreign fighters, offering them protection, 
concealment, and the necessary resources to carry out attacks. The relatively small group 
of foreign jihadis played an important role inside the Sunni insurgency because they were 
willing to carry out suicide operations that the Sunni were not. 
Jeffrey White concludes, “Although AQI began as an essentially foreign jihadist 
organization, it started cooperating early with former regime elements (FREs)” and 
“became more Iraqi over time.” Zarqawi’s “presence in the country before the regime fell 
made this process easier, even though ideological differences between the two groups 
were, and remain, significant.” After a while, “operating under the cover of Sunni Arab 
population,” “AQI came to cooperate with a wide range of other insurgent elements, 
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sharing resources and participating in joint operations.” This cooperation “expanded the 
resources available to AQI, legitimized its presence, and increased its significance as an 
insurgent group.”201  
Zarqawi also received a lot of support from Iraq’s border countries. Some groups, 
like al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, declared their willingness to send fighters and suicide 
bombers whenever Zarqawi needed them: “We have hundreds of jihadis prepared to die 
for the cause and many tons of explosives. You will find in us the strongest support you 
will need to force others to come to a better understanding of the world ‘terror.’ For us it 
translates as ‘victory.’”202 Fishman argues that al Qaeda in Iraq increased “group 
solidarity through shared participation in brutal acts” and used “both ideological and 
operational participation in such behavior as a means of vetting members.”203  
Over time, because of the brutal attacks on Sunnis and pointless atrocities 
perpetrated by jihadis, AQI lost support and alienated itself from the Sunni population. 
White believes that as a foreign network operating in Iraq, AQI did not adapt properly to 
the Iraqi environment and had to fight for its own survival.204 More importantly, the 
mixture of religions, culture, and traditions which exist in Iraq, as well as the experience 
that Iraqis shared together, made it difficult to increase support for al Qaeda terrorists.205 
5. AQI Targets and Reasons for Attacking Civilians 
The Iraqi Body Count registered 47,668 civilian deaths related to violence 
between March 2003 and June 2006. However, the accurate number of civilians killed in 
Iraq is unknown and different agencies published different numbers of victims.206 
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The strategic reasons for targeting civilians is that, finding it difficult to beat U.S. 
and Iraqi Government forces in open fighting, jihadis target civilians in order to impose 
extra cost on the coalition and Iraqi authorities. AQI’s violence against civilians was 
aimed at creating fear among the population, which in the long run conflict would create 
problems for the occupying Coalition forces and new Iraqi government in sustaining 
control.207 
Like other terrorist groups, AQI (by targeting civilians) hoped to “pressure the 
regime into concession or relaxation of coercive control by spreading insecurity to the 
extreme and making the country ungovernable.”208 The organization claimed that its 
attacks against civilians had to “achieve various aims, including pressuring foreign 
governments, discouraging Iraqis from supporting the current government and punishing 
perceived wrongs.” According to the AQI statements, “as well as media reports and the 
views of insurgency experts in Iraq and abroad,” AQI, by attacking civilians, is 
determined “to accomplish the following goals: 
• Punish individuals for collaboration. Attacks on Iraqi translators, drivers, 
contractors and others who work with foreign governments often are aimed at punishing 
them for their collaboration and warning others to avoid such work. 
• Punish groups for collaboration or claims to political power. Attacks on Iraq’s 
religious and ethnic communities – Shi’ite Muslims, Kurds and Christians - are collective 
punishment for perceived cooperation with foreign forces and, in the case of Shi’ite 
Muslims and Kurds, their assertions of national power.  
• Pressure foreign governments to leave Iraq. The abductions and killings of 
foreign civilians often are accompanied by a demand for the removal of a specific 
country’s military from Iraq.  
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• Undermine the Iraqi government. Attacks on Iraqi politicians and government 
officials send the message that Iraqis who participate in the new government risk death 
and the lives of their families.  
• Instill fear in the civilian population. Attacks also may aim to induce Iraqis who 
support the new government to lose faith in the ability of the government and the 
Coalition forces to provide security. 
• Divert resources from military tasks. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects 
force the Iraqi government and Multi-National Force to divert resources to protect 
reconstruction projects, infrastructure facilities, humanitarian organizations and other so-
called ‘soft targets.’ 
• Impede reconstruction. Attacks on Iraqi and foreign reconstruction contractors, 
as well as on oil pipelines, electrical grids and water stations, impede the country’s 
reconstruction and send a message that the new Iraqi authorities cannot provide for the 
public’s needs.  
• Provoke a heavy-handed response. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects may 
goad multinational and Iraqi forces into a heavy-handed response in which civilians are 
killed or civilian infrastructure is destroyed. Such attacks might alienate the population 
and help win insurgent groups sympathizers and recruits. 
• Gain the release of detainees. Insurgent groups have used abducted civilians to 
demand the release of persons from detention facilities in Iraq.”209 
Al Qaeda’s unwillingness to adequately distinguish between civilians and 
combatants was having a devastating impact on the civilians of Iraq. 
6. AQI War on Shia 
The anti-Shia aim of the suicide attacks, masterminded by al Zarqawi, have 
created a wedge between the Shias and the Sunnis, a factor, Napoleoni believes, that 
“prevented the formation of a united Iraqi front, based on secular and nationalist 
                                                 
209 Human Rights Watch, “A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgents Groups in Iraq,” 
Volume 17, No .9 (E), (October 2005), 19-20. 
 66
objectives,” against the United States occupation. Zarqawi knew that if Shia and Sunni 
would eventually unite against the United States, foreign jihadists would be “cut out.” To 
avoid any cooperation and alliance between these two groups, al Zarqawi targeted Shia. 
He wanted to start a civil war to “weaken the Shia position and force the United States to 
leave Iraq without a positive political outcome,” and tear apart Iraq to create a new, Sunni 
state. Zarqawi declared “full-scale war on Shiites all over Iraq, whenever and wherever 
they are found,” and launched a campaign of suicide bombings and assassinations, killing 
and maiming thousands of Shias.210 
Napoleoni argues that Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi put religion front and center in the 
conflict. He merged together Sunni political concerns in postwar Iraq, the legacy of the 
Shia–Sunni rivalry over the centuries, and the future of Islam and Sunnis in Iraq. Al 
Zarqawi accused secular and moderate Iraqi Muslim, as well as Shia, of apostasy. He 
characterized Shia as heretics and blamed them for the support they had given to the 
Coalition forces occupying Iraq. Accusation of apostasy leads to removal from the 
system of social rights and privileges and from the economy, thus it is a powerful 
political weapon.211 
Nasr reveals that the suicide bombings “of market places, police stations, 
mosques, and open-air religious gatherings occurred almost daily, generating a tale of 
sorrow and rage that would tear Shias and Sunnis apart.” In addition, hundreds more 
ordinary Shias were murdered in what has appeared to be random violence. Some were 
shot at home or in the streets. The daily atrocities disrupted Shia lives and turned “their 
commemoration of the death of their imams into a new occasion for mourning.” They 
also underlined the inability of the Iraqi government to contend with the violence, and 
even more, the extent to which the al Qaeda had succeeded in instilling fear in Shias’ 
hearts and minds. “Anger and prejudice were rising on both sides of the sectarian divide.” 
Despite calls for calm, the violence continued to rage, exposing the deep sectarian splits 
that were shaping Shia identity and politics.212 
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These actions were designated to intimidate the Shia and undermine their 
confidence that they would not be able to rule Iraq without Sunni cooperation. Through 
these vicious attacks, AQI wanted to show the Shia that it could keep the violence 
ongoing; and that the United States, as well as the Shia’s chosen government and their 
“venerated religious leaders” were weak and unable to provide security. Nasr believes 
that “this strategy required attacking the country’s infrastructure, along with international 
agencies and humanitarian groups, to weaken the government and prevent it from 
providing basic services to the population.”213 
Fishman believes that Jihadis’ policy had also a wider “strategic purpose of 
building popular support for Zarqawi in the Sunni areas of Iraq and neighboring states, 
without moderating the ideological extremism.”214 These acts of ridiculous violence 
influenced the Shia directly, but were insufficient to support AQI’s international cause. 
Daily massacres of innocent Shias ignited sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni, and 
most importantly, provoked Shia retaliation in the way of death squads perpetrating mass 
ethnic cleansing operations on Sunni Iraqis. Fawaz Gerges notices that many Arab and 
Muslim states demanded al Qaeda “to put an end to terrorism in Iraq and to punish 
Zarqawi and his men for killing civilians, which violates Islamic precepts.” Other 
Islamist organization like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group “strongly 
criticized Zarqawi for killing civilians …and accused his organization of trying to 
‘annihilate’ the Shiites, not to ‘liberate’ Iraq.”215 
D. SUNNI UPRISING AGAINST AL QAEDA 
1. Reasons for Sunni Rebellion 
Sunni opposition to the al Qaeda presence was aroused in 2004 when Sunni 
nationalist insurgent groups “fought with jihadist cells for local dominance,” and this 
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dynamic continued to increase. Some Sunni tribes, tired of al Qaeda atrocities and 
intimidations against Sunni civilians (who were housing foreign fighters), formed the Al 
Anbar Awakening Council “to combat the threat from al Qaeda and its allies,” and to 
expel the extremists from their territories.216 The establishment of the Islamic State, an 
umbrella for al Qaeda, “was the reason of creation the Coordination Bureau with a view 
to uniting the efforts of the moderate national Islamic resistance” to liberate Iraq from 
foreign occupiers and to isolate al Qaeda and extremist jihadis “trading with the blood of 
Muslims.”217 
In autumn 1996 the tribal leaders in the province, including some who previously 
were against the Americans, formed a movement to reject the savagery al Qaeda had 
brought to their region. Al Anbar tribes signed the “Awakening of Al-Anbar” honor pact 
(Sahawa al Anbar), which sought to eliminate all forms of armed acts and protect the 
highway connecting Baghdad, Jordan, and Syria. A local administrative council was set 
up under the chairmanship of Shaykh Abd-al-Sattar al-Muzay (al Qaeda murdered his 
father and three of his brothers) and the membership of representatives of 11 Al-Anbar 
tribes. According to the pact, each tribe had to “recruit a force of 1,000 volunteers” who 
would be “responsible for the protection of a certain part of the highway.” In addition “to 
bringing sectarian killings to an end,” the armed tribal militias were “expected to face up 
to takfiri [those who hold other Muslims to be infidels] killers, murders, and lootings 
against passengers traveling to or from Jordan and Syria.” The Anbar Awakening pact 
“also included the termination of all armed acts and the chasing of takfiris” who were 
responsible “for the deteriorating security conditions in the province.”218  
Michael Eisenstadt believes that several factors accounted for the Anbar 
Awakening and Sunni sheikhs’ sudden change of their front and turning against al 
Qaeda’s jihadists. These reasons include “popular revulsion against the ideology and 
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methods of AQI, the threat that AQI poses to the autonomy of the tribes and their way of 
life, and the damage that AQI has done to the local economy.”219  
The tribal leaders in Anbar Province began to turn to the government and against 
extremists from al Qaeda in summer 2006, “largely due to unspeakable atrocities 
committed by the terrorists against their own hosts.”220 Even though Sunni insurgent 
groups “had no love for the Iraqi government, certain Sunni sheiks, imams, and former 
military officers were upset with AQI’s heavy-handed and brutally violent tactics and 
domination of the black market. Sunnis particularly disliked foreign fighters, who were 
often affiliated with AQI.” Malkasian argues that “This rivalry compelled these Sunni 
leaders to back the formation of locally based police forces, which, in contrast to the 
army, provided them a legitimate avenue to secure their own territory and power.”221 
The chairman of the Al-Anbar Salvation Council, Sheikh Ali al-Hatim al-Ali al-
Sulayman, acknowledged that the Council was fighting against al Qaeda for these 
reasons: the organization “was targeting Iraqi civilians, destroyed the infrastructure, 
killed children, displaced families, and forced people out of their homes. The governorate 
was completely destroyed as a result of the recklessness of the takfiris and the U.S. 
forces.”222 
Toten notices that some of the Sunni sheiks “were enormously unhappy with the 
American presence since fighting exploded in the province’s second largest city of 
Fallujah, but al Qaeda proved to be even more sinister.” Jihadis of AQI “were militarily 
incapable of expelling the American Army and Marines” and they proved to be “worse 
oppressors than even Saddam Hussein. The leaders of Anbar Province saw little choice 
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but to openly declare them enemies and do whatever it took to wipe them out.” “By April 
of 2007, every single tribal leader in all of Anbar province was cooperating with the 
Americans.”223 In response to Sahawa al Anbar, al Qaeda proclaimed the Islamic State 
of Iraq and declared Ramadi “The Capital of the Islamic State of Iraq” on October 15, 
2006. AQI was “threatened by the tribal movement,” so the terrorist groups “accelerated 
their attacks against tribal leaders. They ramped up the murder and intimidation.” AQI 
tried to retake Ramadi but it failed. In acts of revenge, jihadis destroyed a couple bridges 
in al Anbar Province, and started the assassination campaign, killing “off-duty police and 
members of their tribes almost daily, including the sheik of one of the key tribes.”224 
AQI militants killed a Sheikh and held his body for four days, then executed young 
people in public, and attacked the compound of another sheikh.225 
According to intelligence reports, AQI maintained its presence throughout the 
province, even in the summer of 2007, and was “’the dominant organization of influence 
in Al Anbar, surpassing the nationalist insurgents, the Iraqi Government, and the MNF 
[the coalition] in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni.’”226 
In September 2007, Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the indigenous Anbar 
Salvation Council that declared Al Qaeda the enemy, “was killed in a bomb attack … 
near his desert compound.” He was “the sixth tribal leader to be killed since May 2007.” 
That murder, however, did not affect the changes in the hearts and minds of the locals. 
Assassinating a well-respected leader who was widely seen as a savior would only further 
harden Anbaris against the rough men who had ruled them.227 
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2. The Strength of the Tribal System in Iraq  
Eisendstadt believes that “The enduring strength of the tribes in many of Iraq’s 
rural areas and some of its urban neighborhoods” was the “key to efforts to drive a wedge 
between tribally based Sunni Arab insurgents and Al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar province 
and elsewhere, as well as efforts to undermine popular support for the Mahdi Army in 
largely Shi’te neighborhoods and regions of the country.”228 “For centuries the social and 
political organization of many Iraqi Arabs has centered on the tribe.”229 Sunni tribes 
were provided with political, economic, and educational benefits for their support to help 
rule over the territory. “Aligning with tribal sheikhs became a political necessity to 
control over large parts of Iraq.”230 
Kilcullen argues that Sunni tribes in Iraq “are not somehow separate, out in the 
desert, or remote: rather, they are powerful interest groups that permeate Iraqi society. 
More than 85% of Iraqis claim some form of tribal affiliation; tribal identity is a parallel, 
informal but powerful sphere of influence in the community. Iraqi tribal leaders represent 
a competing power center, and the tribes themselves are a parallel hierarchy that overlaps 
with formal government structures and political allegiances.” The Iraqi national character 
is very complex, and “tribal identity plays an extremely important part in it, even for 
urbanized Iraqis. Thus the tribal revolt is not some remote riot on a reservation: it’s a 
major social movement that could significantly influence most Iraqis where they live.”231 
3. Forced Marriages  
The Sunni sheiks argue that the split started over women and that it was the spark 
that ignited the tribes rise against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda fighters “who were initially 
honored as allies, who led the resistance from the front and paid well, had outstayed their 
welcome. Many of the foreigners tried to enforce the strict rules of the Wahhabi strand of 
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Islam: locals were tortured for ‘un-Islamic’ behavior – punished for smoking, drinking 
and possessing photographs and films. The tipping point … [came] when Al-Qaeda 
fighters began forcibly taking sheikhs’ daughters for their wives, perverting a tribal 
tradition of forging alliances through marriage.”232 This standard al Qaeda method of 
cementing alliances through marriage broke “The alliance of convenience and mutual 
exploitation” between AQI and Sunni tribes, for whom “tribal custom” was “at least as 
important as religion.”233 
Al Qaeda has adopted the strategy of forced marriages as a method of creating ties 
with local populations. Through marriage of “al Qaeda leaders and key operatives to 
women from prominent tribal families,” AQI wanted to create a “bond with the 
community,” make use of “kinship-based alliances,” and set the “AQ network into the 
society” to “manipulate local people” over time. Unfortunately for AQ, forced marriages 
outside the tribe have never been culturally accepted in traditional Iraqi society, and tribal 
leaders resisted demands for such marriages. Al Qaeda, “with their hyper-reductionists 
version of ‘Islam’ stripped of cultural content, discounted the tribes’ view as ignorant, 
stupid and sinful” and retaliated with violence. “AQI killed a sheikh over his refusal to 
give daughters of his tribe to them in marriage, which created revenge obligation … on 
his people, who attacked AQI. The terrorists retaliated with immense brutality, killing the 
children of a prominent sheikh in a particularly gruesome manner ….” For Anbaris it 
“was the last straw,” that led to the tribes’ rebellion. “Neighboring clans joined the fight, 
which escalated as AQI … tried to crush the revolt through more atrocities.” The 
rebellion spread “along kinship lines through Anbar and into neighboring provinces.”234  
In Iraq, the al Qaeda strategy of forcing marriages backfired, in part because the 
radical Islamist movement failed to appreciate Iraq’s brand of Islam, tribal traditions and 
customs, and cultural barriers. 
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4. War Economy and Black Market 
Some tribal leaders acknowledged that the split started over women, however 
women weren’t the only issue. “For years the tribes treated the terrorists as ‘useful 
idiots’, while AQI in turn exploited them for cover and support.”235 However, al Qaeda 
“had upset members of the tribes by disturbing their control over the black market and 
infringing on their territory.”236 According to General David Petraeus, “The sheikhs in 
Anbar province ‘all have a truck company, they all have a construction company and they 
all have an import-export business.’” The al Anbar Sunni tribes have traditionally been 
responsible for smuggling across the Syrian border, even under Saddam Hussein. Even 
under the U.S. occupation, the tribes still run smuggling, import/export and construction 
businesses which AQI shut down, took over, or disrupted through violent disturbances 
that were “bad for business.”237 
Many Sunni sheiks contributed “in Iraq’s conflict economy” and transformed 
themselves, “for all practical purposes, into local warlords.” The leader of the Anbar 
Awakening, Sheikh ‘Abd al-Sattar, had “led a band of highwaymen who operated near 
Ramadi and worked as a facilitator for AQI on the side, providing its operatives with 
cars, safe houses, and local guides.” However, AQI jihadis he was helping “started 
working as highwaymen too - encroaching on his ‘turf,’ cutting into his profits, and then 
killing his father and several brothers - the relationship soured, prompting the sheikh to 
turn on AQI and to ally himself with coalition forces.”238 
5. Large Scale Violence against Sunni Civilians 
The “tribal identities” offers “strong incentives for people to seek refuge … as 
protection against pervasive violence and economic insecurity, and for sheikhs and 
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tribesmen to hang together for purposes of survival.”239 The Sunni population abandoned 
the insurgency and stopped giving support to jihadis because “they perceived insurgent 
violence as pointless in the face of a determined government [Iraqi] or occupying power 
[United States].”240 
Atrocities that jihadis from al Qaeda had committed against the Sunni tribe 
Dulaimi completely changed the attitude towards the organization. Jihadis, which killed a 
tribal sheik’s father, “kidnapped his cousin, burned his home to the ground and alienated 
many of his fellow tribesmen by imposing a draconian version of Islamic law that 
proscribed smoking and required woman to shroud themselves in veils.”241 
In contradistinction to popular believe that “radical Islamic groups are irrational, 
crazy, or deviant,” Wiktorowicz argues that these “groups frequently follow a particular 
dynamic that mirrors the rational calculus of other non-Islamic social movement actors 
who have used violence as part of their repertoire of arguments.”242 Acts of ridiculous 
violence and reckless killings perpetrated later on Sunnis by jihadis from al Qaeda in Iraq 
can be understood as part of a rational strategy aiming to punish and deter Sunni civilian 
defection under specific constraints and undermine “the signs of improvement in security 
situation” in al Anbar province.243 Losing support, AQI hit harder and in a more brutal 
manner. Sunni civilians that withdrew their support from the AQI and organized 
opposition against it were being viewed as apostates, according to the narrow definition 
used in Islamist doctrine. This includes the families of former AQI’s allies in the 
insurgency that had left the fight, joined tribal militias or local police, or surrendered to 
the regime. All of these people have become the enemies of AQI fighters, from the 
youngest of their children to the oldest of their elderly. 
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The expanding violence of al Qaeda against Sunni civilians led to greater 
defections to the regime, principally in the form of tribal, anti-insurgent militias. The so-
called awakening of Al-Anbar “came in reaction to some erroneous practices by those 
who were regarded as jihadist.” They were targeting civilians and “destroyed 
infrastructure, killed children, displace families, and forced people out of their 
homes.”244 This response further enraged AQI militants and led them to take revenge, 
even against those who at one point had offered moral, financial, and physical support. 
As the war in Iraq continued, Sunni who were initially sympathetic to the AQI’s 
cause could no longer endure the material costs of the jihadis’ insurgency. Many stopped 
giving support; others turned against the movement. After a few years of sheltering the 
movement, both willingly or because of intimidation, some residents in and around 
Islamist strongholds agreed to form the Anbar Awakening and organized armed tribal 
militias. 
6. A Revolt Spreads Out: Tribal Militias Emerge 
Since summer 2007, a revolt against al Qaida’s methods spread out through the 
Sunnis dominated areas in Iraq. “In Falluja, a set of local tribes, civic leaders, and imams 
supported the creation of a police force of 1,200 following the clearing of the city at the 
end of 2004.” “In Al Qa’im, a city on the Syrian border, the powerful Albu Mahal tribe 
formed the majority of the local security forces, which number over 2,000. AQI had upset 
members of the tribe by disturbing their control over the black market and infringing on 
their territory in 2005.” Other Sunni provinces also started openly fighting AQI “directly 
or as part of the local forces.” “In Mosul, the Iraqi government granted the Jabburi tribe 
influence over the police forces in order to counter AQI.”245 
Formed in 2006, an armed group of Sunni tribal elements, the Anbar Revenge 
Brigade, started actively fighting “al Qaeda’s top members operating in Iraq.” It arrested 
many al Qaeda and foreign terrorists and carried out the killings of al Qaeda elements 
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“avenging the death of the sons … of Ramadi city.” “Groups like Anbar Revenge 
Brigade have come to conclusion that the best way to reduce the coalition troop presence 
in their home regions is to flush out al Qaeda elements in their cities.” Sunni tribal and 
religious leaders who were targeted by al Qaeda further polarized tribes in al Anbar 
against jihadis.246 
The Anbar Revenge Brigade, the Baquba Guardians and similar “armed groups 
made up of tribal members that assist securing al Anbar in conjunction with Iraqi security 
services,” were not “a formal part of Iraq’s security structure.” These groups were created 
with the desire of “taking revenge against al-Qaeda,” and with purpose of “improving the 
security situation in the restive province.” The assassination of senior tribal members by 
al Qaeda prompted tribal leaders to rise up against the Islamist extremists. “The Anbar 
Revenge Brigade was one many Sunni groups that “promised to stop all forms of 
cooperation with al Qaeda and form ‘The People‘s Cells’ to oversee security.”247 
In Baghdad, the revolt against AQI “was based on informal district power 
structures that evolved through the intense period of sectarian cleansing that so damaged 
the city and its people in 2006,” however, “clan connections, kinship links and the 
alliances they fostered” played an important role. In several Bagdad districts local 
communities “formed the neighborhood watch organizations, established access controls 
to prevent people from outside the district coming in without proper authorization and 
driven out terrorist cells.”248 
The emergence of local Sunni tribal militias and implementation of these militias 
into Sunni police units (with greater authority) created “islands of stability and 
significantly [constrained] AQI’s influence in long Iraqi civil War.” Local Sunni police 
units closely connected to the Sunni community, “proved to be remarkably more 
effective in countering foreign [AQI] terrorists and keeping some semblance of law and 
order.” In response “for stepping against al Qaeda and backing the police, the Iraqi 
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government gave local Sunni leaders greater military, economic, and political power.” It 
was “a necessary step in inducing Sunni leaders to support the police, and it enabled 
those leaders to get more members of their community to join the police and stand 
against AQI.”249 
7. Sunni Insurgents Groups Stand Against AQI 
In November 2007, two of the Iraqi resistance groups, the Iraqi Jihad Union and a 
Hamas in Iraq issued a statement accusing al Qaeda in Iraq of brutally killing woman and 
children, as well as “their fighters and commanders,” and mutilating their bodies. “’They 
dug up their bodies from the graves, further mutilated them, beheaded them, and showed 
them off from their vehicles. … They committed all of these acts despite the fact that 
these brothers were faithful to their religion ...’” 
In a similar statement, another insurgent group, Hamas in Iraq, complained that 
“The general public suffered a great deal because of [al Qaeda fighters’] actions.” In 
addition, they blamed AQI that “Every day they witnessed heads or headless bodies lying 
in the streets. Each one of these victims had been accused of a so-called ‘crime’ 
prohibited by al Qaeda fatwahs. The al Qaeda network, has actually made people here 
think that the occupation forces are merciful and humane by comparison.”250 
The Islamic Army, a major Sunni insurgent group also turned against al-Qaeda in 
Iraq because the group in its later attempt “was killing the insurgents and other Iraqis 
who opposes its agenda.” The Islamic Army argued that nobody gave the right to al 
Qaeda to kill Iraqi civilians and more importantly, “All the al-Qaida attacks against the 
Iraqis have affected negatively the performance of the insurgents’ attacks on the U.S. 
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forces …”251 Some Sunni insurgent groups noticed that “their association with al-Qa’ida 
in Iraq was ‘tainting their image as a nationalist resistance force.’”252 
The insurgent’s demands to the leaders of the al Qaeda network, “to rethink their 
bitter journey in Iraq,” to ask themselves “why all the jihadi factions, and the people [of 
Iraq] are standing against them,” as well as “to be more concerned with upholding justice 
and obeying Allah instead of blindly obeying their organization” did not change AQI’s 
terrorist behavior. 
However, all the statements issued by main insurgents groups, “hard-core jihadi 
groups and former al Qaeda allies,” with quite similar complaints, suggested very 
significant developments that the “’tide is turning’ against al Qaeda in Iraq.” The groups 
accused al Qaeda of “brutally attacking and killing their members - attacking and killing 
anyone who does not do their order.” Indiscriminately targeting and killing other 
Muslims, “al Qaeda in Iraq is failing in its effort to position itself as the sole vanguard of 
Muslims.”253 
However, “al Qaeda in Iraq is far from defeated and still has the means to 
continue its attacks in Iraq,” “the public criticism of al Qaeda in Iraq by other insurgent 
groups is a positive turn in the Iraq war, and a huge opportunity the U.S. should 
exploit.”254 “The combination of continuing hostility from some elements of the Sunni 
population and leadership losses…made the environment hostile to a degree beyond 
which AQI can successfully adapt. … Its [AQI’s] role in the insurgency should decline 
over time.”255 Following “losing its largest fighting trench that sheltered its elements in 
al Anbar Province,” al Qaeda in Iraq “is facing a difficult situation that might push it into 
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collapse.” Sunni insurgent factions that “started to wage guerilla warfare” against AQI 
“believe they can crush the organization in Iraq completely.”256 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the implications of al Qaeda’s use of indiscriminate, large 
scale violence against Iraqi civilians and its impact on insurgency in the ongoing war in 
Iraq. This analysis has identified several relevant factors regarding the genesis of 
violence and interactions between the most violent insurgent group in Iraq, al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia, and the civilian population that suffered from its attacks. It specifically 
considered the mechanism of the acts of ridiculous violence that led to rebellion against 
its perpetrators. 
The first section of the chapter presented the Islamist extremist group, al Qaeda in 
the Land of Two Rivers, in context of the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. More specifically it 
examined the genesis, methods and levels of violence against civilians. The second 
section analyzed how AQI has conducted violent actions in order to reach its goal and 
demobilize the threat. The third section answered the question that indiscriminate, large 
scale violence against civilians led to civilian mobilization.  Or, survival by way of 
creating tribal, armed militias that protected local communities from Islamist jihadis’ 
hostilities. It also emphasized the Sunni tribal system as the center of gravity through 
which the successful rebellion against the ruthless methods of al Qaeda was made 
possible. These events provide opportunity for the United States and the Iraqi 
Government to exploit it in pursuing the end of the war. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
By studying the examples of Islamist indiscriminate, large scale violence in the 
civil war in Algeria and ongoing war in Iraq, this research concluded that insurgent 
groups resorting to use violence against civilians was part of a deliberate strategy, aiming 
to combat regime forces and to shape civilian behavior. This is contrary to popular views 
that Islamist violence is an example of irrational, deadly madness motivated by a radical 
religious ideology. There is logic behind it. The Islamist terrorists in both cases shifted 
their main efforts from attacking regimes’ military and security forces to civilian targets 
because they were more vulnerable and had far more political impact. By 
indiscriminately attacking civilians, the GIA, as well as the AQI, committed crimes 
against innocent people, lost popular support and were accused even by radical Muslims 
of violation of the genuine concept of jihad and deviation from its correct path.  In both 
cases, the dynamics of the war exaggerated the level of insecurity, which in turn 
produced a reaction in the form of self-defense groups or tribal militias. 
The ruthless acts of violence and reckless massacres perpetrated by the Armed 
Islamic Group in Algeria in the 1990s were a part of a rational strategy aiming to control 
the civilian population by coercion and mobilize it against the unpopular regime, and 
most importantly to punish and deter civilian defection toward the incumbents. The 
GIA’s massive and ruthless violence performed a communicative function with a clear 
deterrent aspect and it was used at both tactical and strategic levels. Even though large 
scale massacres perpetrated by the Armed Islamist Group in their strongholds against 
people who previously supported them were rational from the GIA perspective, people 
perceived their violence as indiscriminate, being unsure what to expect from Islamist 
insurgents. Since they recognized that Islamist jihadis might abuse them and that 
compliance did not guarantee them security, they started to resist. Algerians perceived the 
GIA’s violence as deeply unfair and excessive. Algerian people wanted to carry on with 
their lives instead of taking sides in the conflict. This senseless violence caused emotional 
reactions, anger and desire for revenge. The GIA’s violence generated incentives for 
collaboration with the regime instead of deterring it. Unable to stop defection in their 
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ranks, the GIA expanded its violence to the whole population, who did not support them 
actively. This tactic, however, backfired. The expanding indiscriminate and brutal 
violence against civilians made people exhausted of the war, alienated jihadis from the 
local population, generated resistance and finally, led to greater defection to the regime 
by way of creating self-defending, anti-insurgent militias to protect local communities. 
The GIA atrocities caused the breakdown in the organization and, what is more, 
turned popular support dramatically against the whole Islamic movement in Algeria. 
Thus the pragmatists in the Islamic Salvation Front, unable to limit the scale of the 
violence and save the image of jihad, recognized that they could no longer reach their 
objective of political inclusion through the use of violence. And so they agreed to a 
ceasefire and joined the political process. The risk of widespread violence followed by 
the series of massacres in 1997 produced “conditions for reconciliation within the army 
and the AIS-FIS.”257 
Similar to the Algerian case, al Qaeda in Iraq increasingly resorted to massive, 
indiscriminate violence against noncombatants to reach their goal of creating an Islamic 
caliphate in Mesopotamia. To maintain control over the population, gain popular support 
and intimidate opponents, and create a constant climate of violence and chaos, AQI’s 
takfiris used indiscriminate terror. What significantly distinguishes AQI’s tactic from that 
of the GIA’s massive massacres is the large scale use of dramatic and horrifying suicide 
missions. 
Indiscriminate and large scale violence against civilian Iraqis, both Shia and 
Sunni, however, alienated the majority of the Iraqi population, and, most importantly, 
caused opposition to the AQI’s tactics among Sunni Iraqis, as well as the foreign support 
base. Sunni tribes in Iraq tired of al Qaeda atrocities and intimidations against Sunni 
civilians who were supporting Islamist fighters turned against the jihadis; and started to 
cooperate with United States forces and Iraqi Army. They formed the Al Anbar Salvation 
Council and with local tribal militias, they began to combat the threat from al Qaeda and 
to expel the extremists from their territories. By waging a campaign of terror against Iraqi 
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civilians, al Qaeda in Iraq made a strategic mistake and alienated itself from the local 
Sunni population. Brutal mass killings were intended to intimidate Sunnis into at least 
accepting to al Qaeda’s presence, if not supporting al Qaeda at all. Al Qaeda in Iraq 
hoped that if jihadis would murder random groups of women and children, the tribes 
would fall back in line. It failed to work and instead, as the car bombs went off, al Qaeda 
lost popular support for its jihad. The local Sunni security forces protecting their own 
communities, cooperating with United States forces and Iraqi Army, “reassures Sunni 
leaders that they will not be permanently victimized in a future Iraq,” and “make such 
leaders more willing to engage in the political process.” The Sunni tribal militias, that do 
not attack Shia neighbors, also undercut AQI’s calls for sectarian violence, thus 
marginalizing extremists from both sides.258 
The spontaneous creation of self-defense militias to protect their communities 
against radical Islamist insurgents, tolerated and in some cases controlled by regime 
security forces, is a classic anti-guerilla model of warfare. This model was implemented 
during the Algerian War of Independence against FLN guerrillas, used by the apartheid 
regime in South Africa and in Peru in the struggle against the terrorist organization 
Shinning Path. This model also occurred and was very successful in combating Islamist 
guerrillas from the GIA in the Algerian Civil War and brought unexpected improvement 
of security in the most violent and hostile province in Iraq – al Anbar. “Pursuing a 
grassroots Iraqization in which greater effort is placed on developing local Sunni police 
forces ... could allow the areas that enjoy relatively restricted insurgent activity to be 
expanded, thereby constraining AQI’s influence. In contrast to the Iraqi Army, local 
Sunni forces can control territory, collect intelligence, and cripple AQI.”259  
Fishman thinks that “extremist ideology, that relishes violence and embraces 
criticism as an indicator of ideological correctness is always going to alienate more 
people than it attracts.” Such a tendency “played out as Iraq’s tribal Sunnis increasingly 
rejected Zarqawi” and al Qaeda jihadis.260  
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Abrahms argues that Jihadis from AQI, so optimistic about usefulness of violence 
for achieving their goals, didn’t make any perceptible progress in realizing theirs 
objectives. Al Qaeda in Iraq, similarly to other terrorists groups, “whose attacks on 
civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve 
their policy objective.” It did not force U.S. occupation forces to leave Iraq and did not 
win control over a piece of territory for the purpose of creating an Islamic state, run by 
Sharia, for future al Qaeda jihad. Attacking civilians, especially Sunni Muslim who 
provided support and sustenance, was not an effective strategy to attain AQI’s policy 
goals. Al Qaeda failed in Iraq because it miscommunicated its policy goals. Sunni viewed 
the deaths of their fellow tribe members and “the resulting turmoil as a proof” that jihadis 
wanted “to destroy their societies” and subjugate them. Finally, the recent polls suggest 
that “’In most majority-Muslim countries … support for suicide bombing and other acts 
of violence in defense of Islam has declined significantly.’”261 
By indiscriminately attacking civilians with senseless violence, the Armed Islamic 
Group and al Qaeda in Iraq separated itself from the population and lost local support.  
Also, as a result, the lost freedom of movement and safe sanctuaries to hide, and became 
more exposed on regime forces attacks. The strategy of attacking civilians in both cases 
proved to be ineffective and led these Islamist groups to failure. 
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